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Calculating Fees of Special Masters
By DAVID I. LEVINE*
Appointments of special masters1 have received a significant amount
of attention in the academic literature. Judges have experimented with
the use of special masters in the management of all phases of complex
cases, including pretrial and discovery,2 settlement,3 and particularly the
creation and implementation of a court's remedial plan4 in institutional
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the diligent research assistance of Mary Catherine M. Bohen, Alan J. Lazarus, and Lois Rich-
ardson, and for the helpful comments on prior drafts by Mary Kay Kane, Stephen LaPlante,
and Vincent M. Nathan. I also express appreciation to my deans for making available summer
research support for this Article.
1. As used here, "'special master' refers to an experienced private attorney, a retired
judge, or a law professor to whom a federal court delegates frontline judicial responsibility" on
a pro hoc vice basis. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential
and Problems, in W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 1, 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MAN-
AGING COMPLEX LITIGATION]; see Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial
Special Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C.D. L.
REV. 753, 754 n.4 (1984) (quoting Brazil, supra). Federal magistrates may perform similar
functions. Magistrates are usually full-time court employees. They are always paid a salary by
the court. Special masters are appointed pro hoc vice and virtually always are paid by one or
more parties. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a) advisory committee notes, 1983 amendment;
Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I" The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1297, 1322-24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Silberman, The American Analogue]; Note, Masters
and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779, 796-97 (1975). But see Christy
& Tessier v. White, 495 A.2d 1291, 1293 (N.H. 1985) (state of New Hampshire frequently
compensates masters, rather than parties).
2. See, e.g., Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Re-
shaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. - (1986) (comparing roles of masters in a variety
of cases); Coolley, Magistrates and Masters in Patent Cases, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 374, 395-
405 (1984). See generally MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1 (collection of arti-
cles on use of special masters in pretrial and discovery, with an emphasis on the use of special
masters in the American Telephone & Telegraph antitrust case); see also Brazil, Kahn, New-
man & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation, 69 JUDICATURE - (1986) (describing the use of spe-
cial masters in an experimental effort to expedite dispute resolution); Peckham, A Judicial
Response to the Costs of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 275-76 (1985) (same).
3. See, eg., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 752-53
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (use of special masters to settle complex class action case brought on behalf
of Vietnam veterans exposed to herbicides).
4. For cases appointing special masters in the remedial phase of institutional reform
[1411
reform litigation.5  One important topic, however, has not received a
great amount of attention:6 the question of how the fees of special mas-
ters should be calculated. 7 This oversight is curious because the fees of
litigation, see Levine, supra note 1, at 760-61 nn.22-25. For a list of articles on the subject, see
id. at 754-55 nn.4-6, 759-60 nn.20-21; see also Alpert, Crouch & Huff, Prison Reform by Judi-
cial Decree: The Unintended Consequences of Ruiz v. Estelle, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 291 (1984);
Levinson, Special Masters: Engineers of Court-Ordered Reform, 8 CORRECTIONS MAG., Aug.
1982, at 6; Note, Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City
of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435 (1984).
5. Many of the standard citations to the institutional reform litigation literature are
collected in 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 827-30 (2d ed. 1984); see also Levine,
supra note 1, at 753-55 nn.l-6, 759-60 nn.20-21. Newer scholarly works include: D. ROTH-
MAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984); Combs, The Federal Judiciary and
Northern School Desegregation: Judicial Management in Perspective, 13 J. LAW & EDUC. 345
(1984); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institu-
tions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Jones, Federal Court Remedies: The Creative Use of Potential
Remedies Can Produce Institutional Change, 27 How. L.J. 879 (1984); Mamlet, Reconsidera-
tion of Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game: Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges
and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685 (1984); Schwarzschild, Public Law by
Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887; Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of
Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041 (1984).
6. Recently, however, there have been some indications that masters' fees are causing
concern. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1701, 1701-02 (1984) (Burger, C.J. & Black-
mun, J., dissenting from order granting application by special master for fees of $64,829.50 in
original docket matter); Legal Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (The United States Justice
Department has "started to balk at paying its share of the special master's costs" in hazardous
waste cases.); San Francisco Chron., May 14, 1985, at 8, col. 1 (California state legislative
subcommittee held hearings on projected $200,000 fees for one year of monitor's services in
federal prison case and voted to cut budget for monitor to $150,000 despite warnings that
federal court would overrule this action.). In the California example, the district court judge
had appointed his 26-year-old former law clerk to the monitor position, and had ordered that
he be compensated at the rate of $75 per hour. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388,
1421-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The state legislative subcommittee was particularly upset at the rate
for the young former law clerk, who had no prior prison monitoring experience, when the
subcommittee learned that the state was paying only $50 per hour for a monitor appointed in a
case brought in state court concerning conditions in the same prisons. The cheaper monitor in
the state court action had experience with prison monitoring in six other states and had 30
years of experience in corrections. Id. The California legislature ultimately forbade the De-
partment of Corrections to use any of its budget to pay for the monitor in the federal case.
McCoy, Nice Work if You Can Get It, 16 CAL. J. 375, 378 (1985) (reviewing the California
controversy).
7. Scholarly commentary on this issue is sparse. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON, CHANCERY
PRACTICE 989-1019 (1904); Comment, Masters and Their Fees, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 403 (1949). In
federal court, the trial judges have broad discretion in deciding who shall pay the fee of the
master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a). Generally, the fees and expenses are
treated as a cost under Rule 54(d). E.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
713 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirmed taxing cost of special master to nonprevailing
party); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). Other
arrangements are possible, however. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2608, at 796-98 (1971) (describing permissible variations); Brazil,
supra note 1, at 28-34 (same).
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special masters can be quite large." Moreover, the related matter of cal-
culating court-set attorney's fees in, for example, civil rights cases, in-
cluding institutional reform litigation, has received an enormous amount
of scholarly attention.9
The purpose of this Article is to provide a thorough discussion of
setting fees for special masters. The Article briefly reviews the history of
the compensation of masters in England and in state courts. The Article
then focuses on the attempts by federal courts to regulate special master
fees in the United States, and considers in particular the appropriateness
of the standards used in institutional reform litigation. The Article em-
phasizes the law in federal court because virtually all of the significant
modern discussion of the problem occurs there. Next, the Article sug-
gests modifications of these compensation standards in order to achieve a
better balance between the needs of special masters for fair, adequate,
and sure compensation and the interests of the parties and of the judicial
system in receiving services at a reasonable rate.
The Article discusses four standards that federal courts have re-
cently considered for setting masters' fees: First, unbounded discretion
8. E.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 691 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1982) (reviewing second interim fee
award of $511,261.98 to special master); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1172 (5th Cir.) (de-
fendants ordered to deposit $150,000 initially for interim payments of costs of special master),
modified in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). According
to the Ruiz defendants, they have now paid over $2.8 million to the special master's office.
Letter from Texas Department of Corrections (Oct. 21, 1985) (copy on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
Although commentators have often noted the potentially burdensome expense of special
masters, they have not focused directly on the appropriate standard for setting the fees. E.g.,
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 3.21 (1981), reprinted in 1 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 155 (2d ed. 1984); Brazil, supra note 1, at 25-34 (1983); Clark,
Difficulties Encountered in a System of Masters, 23 F.R.D. 569, 570 (1958); Kaufman, Masters
in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453-54 (1958); Nathan, The Use of
Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 419, 440-42 (1979) (brief indi-
cation of the problem of an appropriate standard); Handbook of Recommended Procedures for
the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 393 (1960).
This Article focuses particularly on calculating hourly fees for remedial special masters,
which is the most common and expensive method used. On occasion, courts have anticipated
that the master's work will be so extensive that a full-time salary basis will be more
cost-effective. See, eg., Ruiz v. Procunier, No. H-78-987-CA (S.D. Tex. June 11, 1984) (ap-
pointing a full-time monitor in the Houston Office of the Special Master at an annual salary of
$35,000); Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. (D. Ark. 1978) (contract signed hiring "Compliance
Coordinator" at an annual salary of $25,000).
9. The attorney fee literature recently has been collected in Christie, Attorney Fee Shift-
ing: A Bibliography, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 347 (1984) (103 items cited). Subsequent
major scholarly works include: M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS
FEES (1984) (three volumes); Bartell, Federal Court Awards of Attorneys' Fees, in 2 CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1057 (1984); Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984); Attorney's Fees, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 533.
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of the trial court; second, application of a test, developed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1922, that compensation should be "liberal
but not exorbitant"; third, basing the fee on one-half of the prevailing
rates for commercial attorneys; and fourth, basing the fee on some varia-
tion of the lodestar method I of setting attorney's fees. This Article
proposes that courts adopt the lodestar method, with appropriate modifi-
cations to suit the case of special masters. Then, after setting a lodestar,
courts should consider a variety of factors that might affect the amount
of compensation derived from the lodestar, such as preclusion of other
employment, time limits imposed, results obtained, desirability or unde-
sirability of the position, fee awards in similar cases, delays in payment,
and professional responsibility considerations. The Article concludes
that, in many instances, courts should adjust the lodestar downward as a
result of these factors. It is less likely that courts will make an upward
adjustment based on these factors.
Finally, this Article focuses on remedial special masters because the
most comprehensive analyses and the largest fee awards to special mas-
ters have come in remedial contexts. The proposal made here, however,
should be useful in establishing the fee of any special master.
Historical Overview of Special Masters' Fees
England
The early history of special masters' fees can be fairly described as
sordid.'I Although masters seem to have started out centuries ago as
10. The lodestar method begins by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate times the number
of hours reasonably expended by the master. The resulting "lodestar" is then adjusted for
special circumstances affecting the master's work. See infra text accompanying notes 243-79.
11. This Article focuses on special masters' fees and does not attempt to review the gen-
eral history of the use of masters in England or the United States. For such discussion, see, for
example, W. CLEPHANE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§§ 296-301 (1926); A. DOME, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
§ 190 (1928); J. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE 14-57 (1904); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416-45 (3d ed. 1922); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 193-97 (2d ed. 1898); H. POTTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF
EQUITY AND ITS COURTS 15-22 (1931); 2 T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE §§ 1389-
1470 (1909); Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters, in MANAGING
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 337-44 [hereinafter cited as Brazil, Authority]; Ball,
The Chancery Master, 77 LAW Q. REV. 331, 331-47 (1961); Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks
to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 143, 149-60 [hereinafter cited as Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks]; Bryant, The
Office of Master in Chancery: Colonial Development, 40 A.B.A. J. 595 (1954); Bryant, The
Office of Master in Chancery: Early English Development, 40 A.B.A. J. 498 (1954); Diamond,
The Queen's Bench Master, 76 LAW Q. REV. 504 (1960); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates
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rather ill-paid clerks, 12 over time the office became quite lucrative.13 Ed-
ward Jenks, a twentieth-century barrister in the Middle Temple, attrib-
uted the increased profitability of the office to the fact that administrative
suits, such as the guardianship of infants and especially the management
of decedents' estates, were treated as the private property of the master to
whom the case was assigned.14 Masters had total custody and control of
the funds involved for the years of such litigation. They were permitted
to invest the funds for their personal benefit' 5 and paid no interest to the
litigants on these sums.'
6
As a result of these practices, an appointment to a lifetime master-
ship became highly desired and was sold for great sums. 17 Retiring mas-
ters collaborated with the Lord Chancellor, who actually made the
appointments, to obtain payments from the new master in exchange for
the appointment. The new appointee expected to recoup these payments
and to make a profit during his mastership.' 8 This practice became so
abusive that one Lord Chancellor, Lord Macclesfield (Thomas Parker),
Part I: The English Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975); Silberman, The American Ana-
logue, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 7, at 403-07.
The English masters may have had a larger role in the normal processing of cases through
Chancery than special masters have in modem federal courts in the United States, and thus
were more capable of abusing their position to the detriment of the legal system. But the
history demonstrates that there has been an age-old problem with compensating court officers
on a nonsalaried basis.
12. See, eg., Ball, supra note 11, at 333 (describing a "pathetic appeal" to the King in
1325 from a master's clerk who was sick and without means); id. at 337 (describing the seven-
teenth century as generally "one of squalor for the Masters"). But see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 426 ('[I]t had been said of the Masters [in 1382] that they were 'over fatt both
in bodie and purse. .. .' ").
13. "[Tlhat they gained considerable profit ... is clear from the fact that in 1621 it could
be asserted that eight of their number had given £150 apiece for their offices." 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 11, at 417.
14. E. JENxs, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (2d rev. ed. 1922). An alterna-
tive explanation is that it became common in the late seventeenth century for investors plan-
ning to purchase mortgages to leave money with masters until the deeds were prepared and
approved. The masters, who could be ordered to produce the money summarily, used the
money for their own purposes until it was needed. Ball, supra note 11, at 338-39.
15. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 440.
16. Id.
17. Trial of the Earl of Macclesfield, 16 Howell State Trials 767, 871 (1725) (In impeach-
ment trial before the House of Lords for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, Master Elde testi-
fied that he had been told that 5000 guineas would be "handsomer" than the same number of
pounds sterling.); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 439 (office valued at £6000 at the
beginning of the eighteenth century); H. POTrER, supra note 11, at 19 ("Master Elde, being
very anxious to obtain the post, had actually carried 5,000 guineas round to [the Lord Chan-
cellor's] house in a basket that there should be no delay.") ; Ball supra note 11, at 339 (£5000).
18. Ball, supra note 11, at 339.
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was impeached in 1725 for, among other things,19 taking money for
granting permission for the sale of the office of master.20 After the scan-
dals uncovered by the impeachment of Lord Macclesfield, masterships
were no longer sold, but remained an important source of patronage be-
cause the master could appoint others to a number of positions in his
office, such as that of Deputy Clerk.
21
From early times, the greatest abuses of the judicial process arose
from paying the masters and their assistants on the basis of fees for each
service performed. Requiring as many forms and proceedings as possible
was thus to their advantage. This in turn led to incredible delays and
unnecessary expense. 22 Charles Dickens' descriptions in the novel Bleak
19. Edward Jenks notes that the Masters had speculated heavily with litigants' money in
South Sea Stock. When the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, causing a huge deficit in litigants'
funds, "the chief odium" fell upon Lord Macclesfield. E. JENKS, supra note 14, at 212-13;
accord 5 J. CAMPBELL, LivEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 384 (J. Mallory ed. 1874); 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 440. For a brief description of the bursting of the South Sea
Bubble, see, e.g., 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3-5 & 4 n.6 (2d. ed. 1961) (citing schol-
arly and popular accounts).
20. H. POTrER, supra note 11, at 19; Ball, supra note 11, at 340. Ball states that the major
issue at the impeachment trial was whether masters held judicial or ministerial office, there
apparently being little question that Lord Macclesfield took the sums alleged. If masters held
only ministerial offices, the sales transaction was not improper. If, however, masters held judi-
cial office, a statute entitled Against Buying and Selling of Offices, 5 & 6 Edw. VI, ch. 16
(1552), had been violated. Lord Macclesfield was convicted, fined £30,000, and imprisoned in
the Tower of London until the fine was paid. Trial of the Earl of Macclesfield, 16 Howell State
Trials, 767, 1395-97 (1725). The fine was only a fraction of the nearly £101,000 deficit discov-
ered in the accounts of four masters. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 440.
Lord Macclesfield's problem seems to have been that he could not leave well enough
alone:
But unfortunately for the accused earl the investigation proved that he had not been
content with the accustomed honorarium, but had increased the price so enormously,
that it became next to impossible for the appointees to refund themselves, or even to
pay the amount, without either extorting unnecessary fees by delaying causes before
them, or using the money deposited with them, to defray the sum demanded. That
he employed an agent to bargain for him and to higgle about the price there is no
doubt ....
8 E. Foss, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 51 (London 1864 & photo. reprint 1966). The impeach-
ment proceedings are completely reported in Macclesfield, 16 Howell State Trials 767. A sum-
mary of all the charges brought against Lord Macclesfield are in 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 11, at 205. For a description of the trial, see 5 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 386-403.
21. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 440-41. One commentator dryly noted
that, because of patronage, "the office was not invariably filled by a competent official. Incom-
petence did nothing to shorten proceedings ...... H. POTTER, supra note 11, at 19.
22. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 96 (2d ed. 1979) ("One
typical innovation was to lengthen masters' reports by reciting the whole of the previous pro-
ceedings verbatim in a 'whereas' clause before starting on the substance of the report."); accord
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 361-64; H. POTTER, supra note 11, at 15, 19. One
commentator highlighted:
[O]ne out of a hundred prominent sources of an enormous expenditure-the pay-
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House of the dismal state of Chancery proceedings, including the con-
duct of proceedings in the masters' offices, did not exaggerate the true
state of affairs in the first third of the nineteenth century.
23
Nineteenth century reforms in England focused on fixing the sala-
ment for copies of proceedings in the Master's Office. All documents and papers
which in the course of the proceedings had to be submitted by any of the parties to
the Master were copied by his clerks and furnished to each of the other parties
whether they wanted them or not, at at least three times the ordinary charges for
copying. Not to take copies or to shirk your copies was to incur the dangerous en-
mity of the office.
Birrell, Changes in Equity, Procedure, and Principles, in A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 192
(1901 & photo. reprint 1972). Jeremy Bentham derided the "course of retardation to be run,"
with masters receiving payments for "three attendances, and bestowing one." J. BENTHAM,
Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 43
(Bowring ed. 1843). Sir William Holdsworth noted the masters' resourcefulness at increasing
fees by requiring needless attendances, warrants, and copies of papers. Reports were unneces-
sarily long because the size of the fee was based on length. Ingenious masters, having deliber-
ately delayed the proceedings in a variety of ways, then charged a special fee for acceleration.
I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 426, 441-42; see also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
11, at 360. The Chancery Commission of 1850 summed up the procedure in the masters'
offices as "obviously calculated to cause unnecessary delay and expense." Chancery Commis-
sion, First Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners, in 21 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 30
(London 1852).
23. Sir William Holdsworth, the great English legal historian, delivered the 1927 Storrs
Lectures at Yale Law School on Dickens and the law. In one lecture, Bleak House and the
Procedure of the Court of Chancery, he observed:
The physical fog amidst which Bleak House opens, which is so aptly made to
typify the moral fog which enveloped the procedure of the Court of Chancery, is I
think the finest piece of descriptive writing in the whole of Dickens's works. This
moral fog had been produced by a variety of causes, operating through centuries; and
its density had made the court the most crying abuse of an age in which there were
many abuses.
W. HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN 85 (1928) [hereinafter cited
as W. HOLDSWORTH, DICKENS].
In Holdsworth's view, "[ilt was in the master's offices that some of the worst delays took
place, and the greatest expense was incurred." Id. at 98 (citing Taff Vale Ry. v. Nixon, [1847]
1 H.L.C. 111, 126-27, 9 Eng. Rep. 695, 701 (complaining of the chronic delay)).
Dickens knew something of these facts when he wrote,
"From the master, upon whose impaling files reams of dusty warrants in
Jarndyce and Jarndyce have grimly writhed into many shapes; down to the copying-
clerk in the Six Clerks' Office, who has copied his tens of thousands of Chancery-
folio-pages under that eternal heading; no man's nature has been made better by it.
In trickery, evasion, procrastination, spoliation, botheration, under false pretences of
all sorts, there are influences which can never come to good."
W. HOLDSWORTH, DICKENS, supra, at 101 (quoting C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, ch. 1
(1852)); see also J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 95 ("For two centuries before Dickens wrote
Bleak House, the word 'chancery' had been synonymous with expense, delay and despair."); R.
NEELY, THE LAWYERS OF DICKENS AND THEIR CLERKS 51 (2d ed. 1938) ("Dickens was
obsessed with the idea that the one great object of English law was to make business for it-
self."); Birrell, supra note 22, at 193 ("[N]obody. . . can deny the essential truth of Jarndyce
v. Jarndyce.").
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ries of masters, restricting their ability to set their own fees, 24 and estab-
lishing minimum levels of experience for the positions.25 These reforms
apparently succeeded in curbing the worst abuses of the masters. 26
United States
Control in the States
Compared to the colorful history in England, masters' fees in state
courts need little discussion. The states have attempted to regulate the
payment of fees to masters in a variety of ways. States have commonly
used either strict statutory control through a fee schedule,27 or statuto-
rily delegated judicial discretion. 28 As in England, however, the masters
had incentive to increase their work in order to increase their fees pro-
portionately, regardless of which of the two methods of compensation
was used.
29
24. An Act to abolish certain Officers in the Superior Courts of Common Law, and to
make Provision for a more effective and uniform Establishment of Offices in those Courts, 7
Will. & 1 Vict., ch. 30, ss. 18-27 (1852); H. POTTER, supra note 11, at 20; Comment, supra
note 7, at 405.
25. Ball, supra note 11, at 342; see also 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 442-45.
26. E.g., J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 97-98; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 442-
45; Birrell, supra note 22, at 191, 194-96.
27. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2573 (1968) (fee schedule for circuit court commis-
sioners and other persons), repealed by 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 297, § 2 (effective April 1, 1975).
Michigan law now discourages the use of masters for fact-finding. Karibian v. Paletta, 122
Mich. App. 353, 356, 332 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1983); Brockman v. Brockman, 113 Mich. App.
233, 237, 317 N.W.2d 327, 328 (1982).
In the past, some states also attempted to regulate medical and legal fees, as well as mas-
ters' fees, by enacting maximum fee schedules. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 62 & n.5 (1982) (citing Peters, Statutory Regulation of Lawyers'
Fees in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia
from the mid-Seventeenth Century to the mid-Nineteenth Century (May 1975) (unpublished
paper, Harvard Law School)).
28. E.g., ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 53(a); TEX. CIV. PROC. RULES ANN. R. 171 (Vernon 1981);
see Comment, Master in Chancery, 5 BAYLOR L. REv. 374, 381 (1953) (Texas fee practice);
Comment, References in the Circuit Courts of Mississippi, 38 MISs. L.J. 135, 147 (1966) (Mis-
sissippi fee practice).
29. See Brazil, Authority, supra note 11, at 339-40; Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks,
supra note 11, at 151-53. Another important system of fees for professional services in which
the provider of the service in large measure has the power to decide how much service the
"buyer" will receive and pay for-medicine-also shows that such a structure can lead to
inflated costs. See, e.g., E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF MEDICAL CARE 141-43, 216-20, 225-31 (1970); P. STARR, supra note 27, at 225-32, 386-87;
R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 133-39 (1971); Arrow, Un-
certainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 948-54 (1963)
(noting "strong institutional similarities between the legal and medical-care markets"); Bailey,
An Economist's View of the Health Services Industry, 6 INQUIRY 3, 4, 11-13 (1969); Lave &
Lave, Medical Care and its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
252, 263-64 (1970).
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Today only one state practices strict statutory control.3 0 The vast
majority of states command the court to fix the master's fee. 3 1 The prac-
tice in a handful of states defies simple categorization. 32 Some states give
the parties free reign to set the fee. 33 Still other states have no general
30. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.48.100 (Supp. 1985) (measuring masters' fees by the
salaries paid to judges pro tempore); id. § 6.32.280 (1963) (referees in supplemental proceed-
ings receive $5 per day).
31. Most of these states have adopted all or part of Rule 53(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. ALA. R. Civ. P. 53(a); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 53(a); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 53(a);
ARK. R. Civ. P. 53(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1023 (West 1984); COLO. R. Civ. P. 53(a);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 372 (1974); D.C. R. Civ. P. 53(a), 53-I; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.051
(West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-501 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-16
(1976) (masters appointed by boards); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1); IOWA R. Civ. P. 208; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-253(a) (1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 501 (1979); ME. R. Civ. P.
53(a); MD. RULES 2-541(a)(2); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-7-35 (1972); MONT. R. Civ. P. 53(a);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1137 (1979); NEv. R. Civ. P. 53(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 491:23,
498:13, 519:7, 519:15 (Supp. 1983); N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:41-2; N.M. R. Civ. P. 53(a); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § lA-l, Rule 53(d) (1983); N.D. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1); OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(b);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 619 (West 1960); OR. REv. STAT. § 21.510 (1983); OR. R. CIV. P.
65(a)(2); R.I. R. Civ. P. 53(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-53(a) (1984); TENN. R.
Civ. P. 53.01; TEx. CIv. PROc. RULES 171 (Vernon 1981); UTAH R. Civ. P. 53(a); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 1758 (1981); VT. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (provides that state shall pay fee determined
at court's discretion); W. VA. CODE § 59-1-8 (1966); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
32. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52434 (West Supp. 1984) (distinguishing State
Referees formerly on the bench from those appointed from the bar; strictly controlling the
compensation of retired justices, but delegating discretion for others); IND. R. TRIAL PROC.
53(a) (strict statutory control when the trial court sets the fee, but discretion in the state
supreme court to award additional compensation); see also Reilly v. Robertson, 266 Ind. 29,
45-47, 360 N.E.2d 171 (trial court permitted discretion when acting with the "concurrence" of
state supreme court), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.20 (West
1966) (setting lower and upper limits of $5 and $25 per day, but allowing judicial discretion to
specify the exact amount, and further providing that the parties may stipulate to a higher fee,
in which case they would be taxed the excess over the court's determination); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 515.220 (Vernon 1952) (granting the court discretion to award up to $10 per day); Id.
§ 476.450 (retired judges acting as referees to receive one-third their former salary); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 8003 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985) (allowing $50 per day, but providing
that either the court or the parties can depart from that standard); S.C. CODE ANN § 14-11-
320 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (referees to receive $3 per day, though parties may stipulate to a
different fee); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5966a, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (active or retired judges
acting as referees to receive $25 per day in addition to their bench salary); VA. CODE § 14.1-
133 (1978) (strict control for notary-type services, but discretion for other tasks); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 814.13 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (drawing a distinction between compulsory (discretion
allowed) and consensual references (strict statutory control)); see also id. § 814.131 (West
1977) (requiring a hearing whenever the fee for a compulsory reference exceeds $50). But see
MINN. R. Civ. P. 53.01 (providing only that the court shall fix the referee's fees); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. R. 4321 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (providing for judicial discretion); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-37-140 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (master, special master or referee to receive "not less
than $25" per day); TEx. CiV. PROC. RULES 171, 172 (Vernon 1981) (masters in chancery and
auditors, judicial discretion).
33. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1023 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-502 (Supp.
1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.20 (West 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 515.220 (Vernon 1952);
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statutory provision for fixing masters' fees.
34
The experience in the state of Florida provides a good example of
the variety of approaches to setting special masters' fees. At one time,
Florida attempted to combine statutory and discretionary approaches by
establishing a fee schedule for the routine, ministerial tasks frequently
performed by masters, 35 while permitting more generous compensation
for work demanding greater skill.36 Florida has now abandoned this
mixed approach, however, and leaves the decision regarding a special
master's compensation entirely to the court's discretion.
37
Toward a Modern Federal Standard
The modem federal view of an appropriate standard of compensa-
tion for special masters began to develop in 1897 with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Finance Committee of Pennsylvania v. Warren.38 In
that case, a special master was appointed for services in connection with
the sale of a railroad.39 After the property was sold for $250,000, the
master applied for fees of $5,000. The trial court allowed a fee of $4,000,
which the master appealed. In reviewing the award, the Seventh Circuit
panel first noted that the master holds a position of responsibility and
trust, and that
his compensation should be measured accordingly. He should be re-
munerated for the actual work done, and the time employed, and the
responsibility assumed. The amount of compensation should be fixed
with due regard to the magnitude of the interests involved, and to the
responsibility of the position. The amount of such compensation,
while it should b6 reasonable, and perhaps liberal, should not be
exorbitant.40
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 8003 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 21.5 10
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-310, -320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.48.100 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.13 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
34. These states are Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania.
35. Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 1948); Cohn v. Cohn, 36 So. 2d 199, 200-01
(Fla. 1948); FLA. STAT. ANN. 62.07 (1943), repealed by 1967 Florida Laws, ch. 67-254, § 49
(effective June 26, 1967).
36. Marion Mortgage Co. v. Moorman, 100 Fla. 1522, 1526, 131 So. 650, 651 (1930); H.
KOOMAN, FLORIDA CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 141, at 306-07 (1939); id. at
111-12 (Supp. 1958); Comment, supra note 7, at 414-19; A Synopsis of Recent Florida Cases, 2
MIAMI L.Q. 305, 336-37 (1948); see also VA. CODE § 14.1-133 (1978) (commissioners in chan-
cery receive notary-fees for notary-like services; fees for other services prescribed by the court).
37. Donner v. Donner, 346 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ($20,000 fee
reduced to $10,000 for trial court's abuse of discretion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.051 (West
Supp. 1984).
38. 82 F. 525 (7th Cir. 1897).
39. In this era, masters were frequently appointed to conduct judicial sales. Levine, supra
note 1, at 777-78 & nn.97-100.
40. Finance Comm., 82 F. at 527. The court continued:
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Because the railway in question was "a small affair, being only 112
miles in length,"'' a and it was known in advance that only one bidder
would be at the sale, the court reasoned that the master's responsibility
was not great. Recognizing that the trial court could be reversed only for
abuse of discretion, the court of appeals nevertheless rejected the trial
court's award. The court recognized that in other cases in which rail-
roads had been sold for $5,000,000 and $3,000,000 respectively, 42 each
special master had received a fee of $3,500. The court suggested that an
allowance of $2,500 in the case before it would have been "a full and
liberal compensation, and possibly too much."' 43 In the Seventh Circuit's
view, any greater compensation would have been excessive under the
circumstances.
In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court rejected approaches that
other courts had taken. First, the court rejected a ruling 44 that compen-
sation should be measured by the standard of judicial salaries, "which
are not infrequently meager." 45 The court also rejected the considerably
more generous view that the special master's fee should be based on a
percentage of the value of stocks or bonds passing through his hands.
46
Finally, the court rejected the practice of permitting counsel to arrange
the fee prior to the master's appointment. The appellate court reasoned
that, because the master is an officer of the court and holds an office of
dignity and responsibility, "[i]t is not to be tolerated that parties to a suit
may hawk such employment about the street, and award it to the lowest
bidder." 47 Otherwise, the master who had arranged his fee in advance
risked being "the servant" or "a mere dummy" 48 of the parties, to be
Possibly, much ground for complaint would be avoided if the amount of compensa-
tion could be determined by some fixed standard. Yet so various and dissimilar are
the services performed, and the character and extent of the responsibilities assumed,
that it might work injustice to deal with such matters by any ironclad rule.
Id.
41. Id.
42. The court did not provide formal citations to these other cases.
43. Finance Comm., 82 F. at 528.
44. Id. at 527 (rejecting Middleton v. Bankers & Merchants Tel. Co., 32 F. 524
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1887). Middleton expressed the theory that a master's compensation was prop-
erly measured by levels of judicial compensation because the master was aiding the court in the
discharge of its judicial functions. 32 F. at 525. Long after Finance Committee, however,
treatises continued to cite Middleton as an alternate approach. E.g., 2 R. FOSTER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1964 (6th ed. 1920); 3 G. LONGSDORF, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 985
(1928); 2 T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE §§ 1467-1468 (1909).
45. Finance Comm., 82 F. at 527.
46. E.g., Erie Ry. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 766 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 4516).
47. Finance Comm., 82 F. at 528.
48. Id.; see also In re Berkeley, 203 F. 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1913) (Parties cannot make enforcea-
ble agreement as to compensation of master immediately after appointment.). The Finance
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used for their own purposes.
Despite the Finance Committee court's attempt to create a workable
standard, the lower courts for years thereafter were confused regarding
an appropriate standard.49 A major opportunity for clarification was lost
in the early part of the twentieth century. A great reform movement
50
led to the promulgation in 1912 of the substantially revised Rules of
Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States.51 The rule regard-
ing the standard of compensation for masters, however, was left un-
changed.52 Masters' fees were left entirely to the discretion of the judges.
Committee court did note that, once the master's services had been rendered, "it would, of
course, be agreeable to the court, and relieve it of responsibility, if the parties interested could
agree with the master upon an amount of compensation satisfactory to both. But in advance of
the appointment such agreements are improper, and in disrespect of the court." Finance
Comm., 82 F. at 528.
49. See, e.g., 2 R. FOSTER, supra note 44, at 1964-65 n.2; J. HOPKINS, THE NEW FED-
ERAL EQUITY RULES 131-32 (8th rev. ed. 1933) (practices from 1866-1911).
50. The reasons for the reforms are summarized clearly in Brazil, Authority, supra note
11, at 339-40. For earlier discussions of why the equity rules written in the nineteenth century
were generally unsatisfactory, see, e.g., Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701,
706-07 (1927); Breckenridge, The Federal Equity Practice, 5 ILL. L. REV. 545 (1911).
51. 226 U.S. 627 (1912). The most important reform affecting masters was the addition
of the requirement, which in substance continues in Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, that "a reference to a master shall be the exception, not the rule, and shall be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." Equity R. 59, 226 U.S. at
18 app.; cf Rule 74, 42 U.S. (1 How.) lxiv (1842), reprinted in J. HOPKINS, supra note 49, at
126. United States Circuit Judge John C. Rose believed the reason for this addition was that
"references [to special masters] had become in many places so habitual as to result in much
increased cost and in great waste of time." J. ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS 496 (3d ed. 1926). The additional restrictive language in the rule did not
prevent some judges from frequently referring cases to special masters. Lane, Twenty Years
Under The Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV. L. REV. 638, 655 n.51 (1933) ("Many members of
the bar have a very strong feeling that the rules relating to masters' proceedings are being
abused in some jurisdictions. ... ); Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 HARV. L. REV. 276, 296
(1922) ("Some courts seem to disregard the change in Rule 59 and treat many cases as 'excep-
tional' and require very little showing concerning this 'condition' in referring cases .... ").
This problem continued until the Supreme Court held that the exceptional condition require-
ment, which had been carried over in principle into Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was indeed a stringent hurdle limiting appointments of special masters. La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See generally Levine, supra note 1, at 800; Note,
Reference of the Big Case Under Federal Rule 53(b): A New Meaning for the "Exceptional
Condition" Standard, 65 YALE L.J. 1057 (1956).
52. The 1912 Rules provided that "compensation to be allowed to every master shall be
fixed by the district court, in its discretion, having regard to all the circumstances thereof
. .. Equity R. 68, 226 U.S. at 669. The rule had been substantially the same when Finance
Committee was decided. Rule 82, 42 U.S. (1 How.) lxvii (1842), amended by 152 U.S. 709
(1894). When preparing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Committee did
not dramatically alter this provision, which became Rule 53(a) in 1938. See FED. R. Civ. P.
53(a) advisory committee notes, reprinted in 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 492
app. C (1973).
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The United States Supreme Court attempted to end the confusion
when it accepted a special master's fee case in 1922. In Newton v. Consol-
idated Gas Co. 53 the Court reviewed the compensation and disburse-
ments of the special master who had been appointed to serve in a group
of eight cases involving the maximum selling rate for natural gas under
New York state law. The lower court awarded the special master, who
worked for a total of 282 days in the eight suits, a total compensation of
$118,000. 54 The master submitted reports to the trial court on four sepa-
rate occasions. 55 In reviewing the court-awarded compensation, the
Supreme Court recognized that it was bound by Equity Rule 68, which
rested discretion in the district court.56 The Court stated, however, that
this discretion did not "extend to arbitrary and unreasonable action."
'57
In establishing a standard for reviewing the district court's exercise
of discretion in setting special masters' fees, the Supreme Court essen-
tially adopted the standard that the Seventh Circuit had announced
twenty-five years earlier in Finance Committee:
[T]he value of a capable master's services cannot be determined with
mathematical accuracy, and estimates will vary, of course, according
to the standard adopted. He occupies a position of honor, responsibil-
ity, and trust; the court looks to him to execute its decrees thoroughly,
accurately, impartially, and in full response to the confidence ex-
tended; he should be adequately remunerated for actual work done,
time employed, and the responsibility assumed. His compensation
should be liberal, but not exorbitant. The rights of those who ulti-
mately pay must be carefully protected; and while salaries prescribed
by law for judicial officers performing similar duties are valuable
guides, a higher rate of compensation is generally necessary in order to
secure ability and experience in an exacting and temporary employ-
ment which often seriously interferes with other undertak-
ings.58
The Supreme Court then explained why, under these principles, the
lower court had abused its discretion in setting the fee. The Court recog-
nized that the master's services were "protracted, painstaking, and for
53. 259 U.S. 101 (1922).
54. Id. at 104. The "days" of work were calculated as five hours each, considered the
average court day in the particular district. Id.
55. Id. The record in the longest case comprised approximately 20,000 printed pages;
records from the other cases ranged from 1417 to 2929 pages. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Finance Comm., 82 F. at 527; Middleton v. Bankers' & Merchants' Tel.
Co., 32 F. 524, 525 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1887)). The Court prefaced these citations merely with a
"see" signal. There is no other indication that the Supreme Court had adopted the Seventh
Circuit's position in Finance Committee and had borrowed liberally from that opinion's
language.
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the most part excellent," and that large sums were at stake in these
cases. 59 Nevertheless, the Court said that, after reviewing the record, it
could not "doubt that the allowances are much too large-certainly
twice and three times what they should be."'60 By converting the
master's time devoted to all of the cases, 282 days, to the equivalent of
one year's service, the Court noted that the total allowance of $118,000
was fifteen times the annual salary of the federal trial judge in the cases,
and eight times that received by the Supreme Court justices themselves.
61
The Court also compared the fee to the yearly salaries of the mayor of
New York City ($15,000), the governor and the judges of the highest
court of New York ($10,000), and the judges of the trial court in the City
of New York ($17,500).62
Acknowledging that none of these salaries could serve as "a rigid
standard," the Court stated that they should nonetheless be considered
when determining the appropriate compensation for a special master.
The Court also noted that the duties performed by this special master
were not "more onerous or responsible than those often performed by
judges. ' 63 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's fee
award, and remanded with instructions to set the compensation within
specific limitations for each of the eight cases. The Court's instructions
permitted a total compensation of not more than $49,250, just over forty
percent of the trial court's original award.64
59. Newton, 259 U.S. at 104.
60. Id. at 106.
61. Id.
62. For the sake of comparison, recent salaries for these officials are:
Chief Justice of the United States-S 100,700
Associate Justice of the United States-96,700
United States District Judge-$73,100
Mayor of New York City-80,000
Governor of New York State- $85,000 (plus $15,000 for expenses)
New York Court of Appeals Chief Justice-$78,750
New York Court of Appeals Associate Justice-$75,600
Supreme Court of New York-$60,900
J. WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN ALMANAC OF JOBS AND SALARIES 162 (2d ed. 1984) (Mayor of
New York City); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1982-83,
at 152-53, 256-57 (1983) (other New York officials); THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF
FACTS 324-25 (1985) (federal judges).
63. Newton, 259 U.S. at 106.
64. The Court allowed a maximum of half the trial court's award in the longest case, and
up to one-third in each of the seven smaller cases, up to the overall maximum. Id.
The Supreme Court had not seen the last of this case. The special master, a member of
the bar of the Supreme Court, took the position that the Court's opinion, and the district
court's order on remand, merely set the maximum amount of his compensation that could be
recovered as costs from the party that had not advanced his fee. The master believed that he
need not return the excess fee to the party who had paid initially. Because the fee had been
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Application of Newton in the Lower Courts
Some courts and the leading commentators have viewed the Newton
standard to be authoritative on compensation for masters in federal
court.65 Although the Supreme Court intended the Newton test to be
used in fixing the compensation of masters, surprisingly, the lower courts
frequently have ignored Newton. Lower courts often have granted
awards of fees within their discretionary power under the Equity Rules,
or later, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, without giving reasons
under the Newton factors, or even acknowledging that the Supreme
Court had spoken on the matter.
66
advanced by the party that had won on the merits, and the losing party had to pay no more
than its share of what the Supreme Court permitted, the matter was not appealed immediately.
The Court eventually held that the special master's position was untenable, and ordered the
restitution of the excess fee with interest. In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 6, 9 (1928). In a final opin-
ion, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that mere restitution of the
excess fee, even with interest, was not sufficient punishment for the master's departure from
duty. To demonstrate the "high obligation" of members of the bar to respect its decisions, the
Court gave "a punitive quality" to its action. The master was suspended from membership in
the bar of the Supreme Court for six months, and ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding.
Id. at 298-99.
65. E.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. American Sur. of N.Y., 64 F.2d 577, 582-83 (4th
Cir. 1933); First Trust & Say. Bank v. St. Louis Coke & Iron Co., 29 F.2d 506, 507 (7th Cir.
1928) (noting Supreme Court's admonition not to be "generous with other people's money");
Reed v. Rhodes, 516 F. Supp. 561, 568 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (Newton is "seminal"), rev'd, 691
F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1982); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (D.N.J. 1979);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 14 F. Supp. 134, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1936). The
leading modern treatises accept that Newton has defined the standard. 5A J. MOORE & J.
LucAs, supra note 8, 53.04[1]; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 2608. There was
initially some doubt whether this test was meant to be truly definitive. See, eg., Roxana Petro-
leum Corp. v. Colquitt, 34 F.2d 470, 479 (W.D. Tex. 1929) ("The court. . . does not feel the
decision in [Newton] is so full and complete as to be controlling in any sense upon the court
here, but to be considered as suggestive of matters proper for consideration by the court in
fixing compensation."), affid, 49 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931).
66. See, e.g., the following cases, none of which cite Newton: EEOC v. International
Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 631 F.2d 81, 82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1010 (1980) (no abuse of discretion in setting $2500 fee); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401,
425-27 (1st Cir.) (no abuse of discretion in setting fee of $200 per diem for each of four mas-
ters), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373,
379-80 (2d Cir. 1969) ($15,000 fee affirmed), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970); Reid v. Silver,
354 F.2d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 1965) ($25,000 fee affirmed, even though it was "approaching the
point of being excessive"); Woods v. Pielet, 187 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 1951) ($1050 fee
awarded by district court reduced to $600); Rauer v. Hatfield, 295 F. 48, 52 (9th Cir. 1924)
(Equity Rule 68 cited); Chang v. University of R.I., 606 F. Supp. 1161, 1279 (D.R.I. 1985)
(masters entitled to "reasonable compensation" and "reasonable expenses"); In re Chicken
Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 943, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (fee request approved as "fair and
reasonable"); Texaco Export, Inc. v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 477 F. Supp. 289, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y.) ($15,500 "reasonable" for 267.25 hours), affid mem., 614 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1979);
Chesa Int'l Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.) ($100 per hour
approved for hours for which master chose to charge), afl'd mere, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir.
September 1985] FEES OF SPECIAL MASTERS
Many of those courts that cited Newton did not analyze carefully the
special master's compensation under the factors in that opinion. 67 Lower
courts apparently rely on Newton primarily when they desire to reduce a
special master's fee. 68 On rare occasion, however, courts have recog-
1977); Frigiquip Corp. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 75 F.R.D. 605, 612 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
($5000 reasonable for 133 hours, based on time spent, nature of the reference, and unspecified
circumstances); In re Revenue Properties Co. Litig. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 613, 615 (D. Mass.)
(requested $75,000 fee approved, court cited attorneys' fees cases), vacated mem., 502 F.2d
1161 (1st Cir. 1974); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 207 F. Supp. 262, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
($3500 fair fee because of extenuating circumstances, even though report delayed one year
after last hearing and was prepared in haste), aftd on other grounds, 315 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir.
1963) (fee reduced to $1500); W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, 206 F. Supp. 878, 891
(W.D. Va. 1962) ($1000 fee awarded for 81 hours, master took "comprehensive depositions,"
and wrote "clear and ... concise" report), modified on other grounds, 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir.
1963); Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 139 F. Supp. 809, 818-19 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
($15,000 request cut to $12,500, one party objected to size of fee, no further reasons given);
Mallonee v. Fahey, 122 F. Supp. 472, 480-81 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ($100,000 fee set as "fair and
reasonable"); Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co. v. Patrol Valve Co., 106 F. Supp. 427, 432-33
(N.D. Ohio 1952) ($23,000 request cut to $18,000 based on court's "considered judgment" and
taking into account "the method of admeasuring the relative value to be attached to public, as
compared with private, employment"), afj'd, 210 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1954); Soya Processing
Co. v. Sirota, 104 F. Supp. 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ($2500 fee approved; court considered
time consumed, importance of matter, amount involved, standing of master in the bar, and
master's thoroughness); Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 655, 656 (D. Conn.
1950) ($10,000 a reasonable award for 444 hours, including 25 days of hearings and extensive
subsequent research and consideration; court considered that an attorney's annual net salary
for 1500 billable hours would be close to $20,000, "which might well be taken as a norm for
services of a judicial nature of some difficulty and magnitude . . . that . . . might well be
increased somewhat in a case of this size and complication"), appeal dismissed, 188 F.2d 306
(2d Cir. 1951); Strong v. Broward County Kennel Club, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 262, 263 (S.D. Fla.)
(parties agreed master's request for $3500 reasonable), appeal dismissed, 170 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.
1948); Penmac Corp. v. Falcon Pencil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 358, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (request
for $1200 plus disbursements fair and reasonable when master gave great deal of time and
much study); Gold Seal Importers, Inc. v. Morris White Fashions, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 386, 389
(S.D.N.Y.) ($2000 request, $1500 awarded), afl'd, 152 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1945); John B. Stet-
son Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp. 586, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (master's request for
$3000 cut to $1500 for 27 hours of hearings over 6 days, 8 days studying record, briefs, and
law, and 34 hours writing report); United States v. 9,890 Acres of Land, 57 F. Supp. 626, 628
(E.D.N.Y. 1944) ($400 fee plus disbursements awarded); Barrineau v. Carolina Milling Co., 52
F. Supp. 197, 200 (E.D.S.C. 1942) (special referee gave a great deal of time to case, including
several days away from home and a thorough search of the law; in view of small amount
involved, fair allowance set at $200); Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 29 F. Supp. 729, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1939) (master's requested fee of $1500 cut to $1000); Steinfur Patents Corp. v.
Meisel-Galland Co., 27 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) ($3000 fee requested and awarded,
parties had no objections).
67. E.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 399, 419 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), modified on other grounds, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); cf. Pennsylvania v. Local 542,
Operating Eng'rs, 507 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Newton in imposing cost of
master on the party whose conduct necessitated the reference), aff'd, 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.
1981) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
68. E.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, 159 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1947) (affirming district
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
FEES OF SPECIAL MASTERS
nized the full import of Newton and have used the case as a springboard
for a reasonably thorough discussion of the issues related to appropriate
compensation of a special master. Because such complete analysis is so
unusual, these cases deserve somewhat fuller discussion.
The oldest such case, Universal Oil Products Co. v. Hall,69 dealt with
a special master who had honored the office in the glorious tradition of
Lord Macclesfield. 70 One Holmes Hall, an attorney practicing in Seda-
lia, Missouri, who previously had never earned more than $5,000 per
year, was appointed special master to take testimony and to prepare a
report in a 1921 patent infringement suit between two oil companies.
Hall obtained his appointment by calling upon the chief patent attorneys
for the plaintiff and the defendant and soliciting their agreement to his
appointment as special master. He then informed the district judge that
he had reason to believe the attorneys would agree to his appointment. 71
Upon his appointment, the special master first asked the parties for $250
per day, and later for $150 per day. The parties and the master, however,
stipulated to a per diem of $100, plus expenses, for all time spent away
from home and all time devoted to the matter while at home, such as
making the report. Compromising the master's demands for a higher fee,
the stipulation also provided that the master could receive any additional
sum allowed by the court.
72
From the outset, the master did not "comport himself with the dig-
nity and reserve proper to the office."' 73 The master's distinctive impro-
priety was that, long after he began serving and had heard substantial
testimony, he approached a court reporter and proposed that the re-
porter attempt to bring about a settlement of the case. The master would
pay the reporter, if successful, $25,00074 out of the anticipated fee of
$250,000 to $300,000. 7 5 To the court reporter's credit, he promptly in-
court's allowance, "under the principles of Newton," of an additional award of only $2500 to
master who had requested $20,000 extra compensation); cf Official Creditors' Comm. of Fox
Mkts. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461, 464-66, 469-71 (9th Cir. 1964) (quoting "pertinent observation[s]"
from Newton in reducing trial court's award of $170,000, which was based upon request of
attorneys for bankruptcy trustee for $200,000 in fees, to $50,000), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978
(1965).
69. 76 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935).
70. See supra notes 19-21 & accompanying text.
71. Hall, 76 F.2d at 259.
72. Id.
73. Id. The master himself testified that he was like "the parrot that talked too damn
much." Id.
74. The master may have offered "only" $10,000. Id. at 260.
75. Id. The master testified that "I thought it was perfectly proper to advise Jones [court
reporter] while I was Master that the thing for him to do was to paint as black a picture of the
defense side to the defendant and to the plaintiff's side to the plaintiff." Id.
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formed one of the defendant's attorneys that this offer had been made.
The reporter then cooperated in a plan to obtain confirmation of the offer
of a settlement fee from the master.7 6 Upon receiving written confirma-
tion, the defense attorneys prepared a motion for removal of the special
master, but this formal petition was not filed. After discussion with the
parties, and the intervention of a United States Senator who was a per-
sonal friend of the special master, the district court ordered important
modifications to the special master's original appointment. 77 The master
was deprived of the power to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and he was no longer required to make a report. He was, however,
permitted to continue as an examiner before whom testimony could be
taken.78
The master ultimately was paid $99,900, at the stipulated rate of
$100 per day for 999 days.7 9 After the suit was settled by the parties
without a trial, the master filed a petition for additional compensation.
Conceding that he had been fully paid under the original stipulation, he
based his claim for additional compensation on "time which was lost to
him in holding himself in readiness to resume and hold hearings at such
time as the counsel might find convenient and agreeable." 80 Although
the litigants responded to this petition by seeking a refund of all monies
paid to the master because of his prior misconduct, the district court
76. The incriminating letter from the master confirmed the offer to pay the court reporter
if the case were settled. The master explained that he would be saved an enormous amount of
work because he would not have to prepare a report. Moreover, if the case were settled, he
thought that he could represent " 'consistently, and with full propriety' " any oil company
later wishing to retain him. Id. at 261. On the other hand, if he had to render a decision, he
would have spent three years as special master learning the oil refining business without
"reap[ing] any advantage of the knowledge thus gained." Id. at 260-61.
The resourceful special master did not depend on legal services alone to reap a harvest
from the expertise he gained in this case. Shortly after hearing the expert witnesses testify
concerning the validity and extent of the oil-processing patents at issue in the lawsuit, the
master claimed to have invented a similar process, and had an attorney prepare an application
to patent his new "discovery." Id. at 261.
77. Id. at 262.
78. Under Equity R. 47-53, 226 U.S. 627, 661-64 (1912), an examiner was distinct from a
master. An examiner could be appointed to supervise passively the taking of testimony and
report it to the court. The examiner, however, had no power to regulate the deposition. See.
e.g., W. CLEPHANE, supra note 11, § 291; W. SIMKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 790 (rev. ed.
1934). In Rule 53(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the term "master" was expanded
to include the narrow examiner role. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO, July 21-23, 1938, at 330 (W. Daw-
son ed. 1938) (remarks of Robert G. Dodge).
79. This sum was comprised of 550 days of taking testimony, and 447 days devoted to a
study of the record and legal research preparatory to returning findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Hall, 76 F.2d at 262. The two day discrepancy is unexplained.
80. Id.
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allowed the special master the additional sum of $12,000.81
In reviewing this award, the court of appeals held that the district
court had erred in construing the parties' stipulation to require addi-
tional compensation. 82 In any event, the trial judge was not restrained or
bound by the stipulation. The appellate court stated that, upon being
presented with the petition for fees and the evidence of the master's mis-
conduct, the trial court's duty was "to make stem and searching inquiry
into the facts."' 83 Citing Newton, 84 the circuit court said that "no halfway
measure should be considered, but the court officer must be held to strict
accountability. ' 85 Because the master's powers to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law had been withdrawn as a result of his misconduct,
the sums paid to him to review the testimony and to conduct legal re-
search were wasted completely. "[N]o possible ground" existed to justify
permitting the master to keep the sums paid for these useless services.
86
Accordingly, the court believed that it had the plain duty to command
the special master to restore all money paid for study in anticipation of
making a report that he was no longer directed to render.87 The court
noted that restitution could be ordered upon the trial court's own motion
or upon the motion of the litigants for an accounting and restoration of
amounts lost due to misconduct. 88
In 'the course of reprimanding the master, and, by implication, the
trial judge who merely had revised the master's powers instead of remov-
ing him and who had approved the request for additional compensa-
tion,89 the Eighth Circuit provided its views of the proper status and
conduct of a master.90 That an appellate court had to review and reverse
81. Id. at 263. The additional compensation for "readiness" was calculated at $2000 per
year for six years.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 259 U.S. 101 (1922).
85. Hall, 76 F.2d at 263.
86. Id. at 264.
87. Id. Hall was ordered to repay $44,700, plus six percent interest, from the date the
district court stripped him of the powers of a special master and left him with the considerably
more limited powers of an examiner. Id. at 265.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 262.
90. The court stated:
[A] master is a public servant engaged in a public function. He is an aide to the court
of his appointment. He is not the servant of the litigants, nor the servant of their
attorneys. He has a positive duty and must exercise firm discretion to cause the
business confided to him to be brought to a conclusion within reasonable bounds of
time. It is gross dereliction for him to seek to ingratiate himself with attorneys by
blind indulgence or to sit supinely by while unconscionable delays defeat the ends of
justice.
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such an egregious case demonstrates the need for trial courts to monitor
carefully the work of special masters and to review compensation re-
quests with care.
The principles outlined in Newton are still alive, and not only in
cases from two generations ago or in instances of gross abuse of office. A
prime example is the 1979 case of Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co. 91 The
trial judge had previously determined that the defendant had violated
Title V11 92 by discriminating against its female employees. For the dam-
ages stage of the case, the court appointed three special masters to deter-
mine the validity of the claims of individual class members. 93 The trial
court, with the agreement of the parties, needed three masters because
there were ten thousand potential claimants, and in many of these cases,
individual consideration of the claims would require a substantial
amount of work. The parties and the court recognized that the special
masters had to be experienced trial lawyers who would be prepared to
deal with any discovery problems that might arise even before reaching
the merits of individual cases.
94
Although the parties had agreed that the special masters needed
particular skills, the defendant, found liable for the discrimination and
therefore for the full cost of the master's compensation, suggested that
under Newton, the compensation should be keyed to the salary of a dis-
trict judge or, preferably, a magistrate. 95 The court rejected that sugges-
tion, reasoning that it was in the best interest of the class members to
appoint attorneys with strong reputations for integrity, community ser-
vice, litigation skills, and experience. 96 To justify the imposition on the
time of such highly qualified people, the court found that they should be
compensated "in a manner comparable to what they receive in their pri-
vate practices," without a limitation based upon the salary of a judge
with no overhead, personnel, or other costs.97 The court recognized,
however, that in the "more typical case," an attorney appointed to serve
as a special master should expect to receive "at least some of his compen-
sation in the honor of his selection and service."' 98 The court concluded
that this was not such a case because of the substantial amount of time
Id. at 264.
91. 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(e)(17) (1982).
93. Kyriazi, 465 F. Supp. at 1143.
94. Id. at 1147.
95. Id. On that basis, the defendant suggested a rate of between $30 and $40 per hour.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1147-48.
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required to provide individual consideration to the large number of po-
tential claims.99
The district court then discussed and quoted from the Newton case.
In its view, Newton held "that the proper compensation should be keyed
to public salaries with a premium to attract persons of high caliber from
the private sector." eo The court noted that, since Newton, the issue of
special master compensation had received little discussion. Conse-
quently, some courts had approved awards roughly comparable to pri-
vate practice renumeration,101 while other courts had used a lower
rate. 102
In the face of uncertain precedent, the trial court found it to be in
the interest of all parties and, in particular, in the interest of plaintiff
class members, to compensate the three special masters in a manner
roughly comparable to what they received in their practices. The court
recognized the "thorny" path ahead for the masters, which would in-
lude "complex questions of damage, difficult and tedious discovery dis-
putes, hearings and fact finding." 10 3 Not only would the masters be
diverted from their, own practices, which would cause a loss of present
business income, they would also lose future business from foregoing suc-
cessful attorney-client relationships as a result of the appointment. 1°4
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in 1922 suggested
that special masters were in "temporary" employment and therefore
should be compensated only "slightly in excess of the salaries of public
officials." 10 5 This approach, however, was no longer viable in light of the
realities of current law practice and the long-term nature of the masters'
task. Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants' proposed level of
compensation, which was less than many firms in the area billed for
99. Id. at 1148.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Chesa Int'l Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.)
($100 per hour fee), affid mem., 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977)); American Safety Table v.
Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1969) ($40 per hour rate approved in 1969), cert denied, 396
U.S. 1038 (1970).
102. Kyriazi, 465 F. Supp. at 1148 (citing Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp.
699 (E.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), affid, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1975), as holding that fee of law professor in school desegregation case would be about half
that charged by attorneys in private practice, but all overhead costs paid).
103. Kyriazi, 465 F. Supp. at 1148.
104. Id.
105. Id. Although the district court stated that the Supreme Court in Newton had permit-
ted compensation only "slightly in excess" of the salaries of public officials, in fact, the guide-
lines adopted in Newton provided for compensation substantially above prevailing salaries for
high public officials, including the Supreme Court Justices themselves. See supra text accom-
panying notes 59-64.
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paralegal clerical help. 10 6 The court instead awarded $125 per hour to
the attorney designated as the Administrative Special Master, and an
hourly rate of $115 to the other two masters. This was less than what
each would usually bill for such service, but the three attorneys had indi-
cated their willingness to accept less than their normal rates because of
their obligations as members of the bar. 107
Hall and Kyriazi show that judges who are cognizant of Newton and
attempt to supervise a special master's compensation under its standards
are much more likely to give reasoned and appropriately careful supervi-
sion to the special master's fee request. On the other hand, standardless
review of a fee request is simply an arbitrary exercise of discretion 0 8 and
is less likely to lead to a careful and fair evaluation of a master's fee
request.
The Fees of Remedial Special Masters: The Reed Saga
In general, the judges who have appointed remedial special masters
in institutional reform cases have been no more scrupulous than in other
cases in their use of the Newton factors to establish an appropriate
master's fee. In the typical institutional reform case, the trial judge es-
tablishes a figure for the special master's fee, but does not explain it
under Newton. 109 It is surprising that the judges have not been especially
careful with the fees for remedial special masters, because in several cases
the fees have had symbolic significance as a point of defiance for various
state officials and legislators. 110
106. Kyriazi, 465 F. Supp. at 1148.
107. Id.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 222-26.
109. E.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1172 (5th Cir.) (District court set master's fee at
$95 per hour in statewide prison case.), modified in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1131 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(ordering parties to submit name of person to be appointed special master in prison case; not-
ing that master will be paid at a monthly rate to be later established, and inviting parties to
suggest appropriate rate); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Carey, 551 F. Supp.
1165, 1194 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (setting fee of special master for Willowbrook State School at
$325 per diem, up to 150 days per annum, plus budget for assistants and expenses), aft'd in
relevant part, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Halderman v. Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 428, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (special master ordered to
submit budget providing for substantial reductions in the costs of operating the master's office
supervising institution for the mentally retarded), afid, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1131, restored to calender for reargument, 463 U.S. 1226 (1984); Valen-
tine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. 294, 305-06 (D.N.J. 1979) (setting master's fee at $85 per hour
in county jail case); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 270, 272 (D. Mass. 1975) ($200 per
diem for each of four special masters in school desegregation case reasonable), affid, 530 F.2d
401, 425-27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
110. In the Pennhurst case, the state defendants were held in contempt and incurred fines
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On rare occasion, a court cites Newton, but does not thoroughly dis-
of $10,000 per day rather than obey a court order to obtain an appropriation for funding the
office of special master. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 631
(E.D. Pa. 1981), af'd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1315
(1984). The district court transferred some of the fines to the special master to operate his
office. Halderman v. Penhurst State School & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
In the Willowbrook State School case, the trial court found the governor and comptroller
of the State of New York in contempt when they failed to persuade the state legislature to
appropriate $342,000 to support a review panel, which had been a provision of the case's
consent judgment. New York Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1110
(E.D.N.Y. 1980). The Second Circuit reversed the contempt finding because the consent judg-
ment required the governor to act only "within his 'lawful authority. . . and subject to any
legislative approval that may be required.'" New York Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Carey,
631 F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1980). In addition, several federal courts have been forced to use
their rarely invoked authority under Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require
payments in institutional reform litigation when state officials have refused to issue checks.
Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d
804, 805-07 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268,
1270-72 (5th Cir. 1980), rehg granted, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981); La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
545 F. Supp. 36, 37-39 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (attorney's fee cases).
The modern record for state defendant pique toward a master's fee in federal court proba-
bly was achieved in the Arkansas prison litigation. -See generally 0. Fiss & D. RNDLEMAN,
supra note 5, at 528-752 (thorough review of the entire course of the litigation). In one of the
many published opinions in the case, Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Ark.
1978), the district court approved a consent decree in which the parties agreed to hire a com-
pliance coordinator at the defendants' expense rather than have the court formally appoint a
special master. For a discussion of the distinction between a special master appointed under
Rule 53 and the more experimental compliance coordinator, see LaPlante, An Alternative to
the Special Master: Institutional Planning with a Compliance Coordinator (Aug. 18, 1980)
(Paper for 110th Congress of Correction of the American Correctional Association) (on fie
with The Hastings Law Journal). After Stephen LaPlante, the compliance coordinator, served
for about two and one-half years, the defendant Board of Correction refused to renew his
contract, citing a lack of confidence in his work. But see LaPlante says politics block reform,
Ark. Democrat (Little Rock), June 7, 1981, at 1, col. 1. The district court allowed termination
of the position of compliance coordinator, but ordered LaPlante to write a final report in
preparation for another evidentiary hearing on compliance with the previous court decrees.
LaPlante was given 45 days to fie his report; the court later extended the time another 15
days. Finney v. Mabry, No. PB-C-69-24 (D. Ark. Mar. 31, 1981 & May 12, 1981). Although
the state paid La Plante and his staff for the initial 45 days (as it had for the previous two and
one-half years), the state legislature repeatedly refused to pay $2000 for the final 15-day exten-
sion for LaPlante and one of his assistants. [Governor] White has authority to ensure payment
made, LaPlante says, Ark. Democrat (Little Rock), Aug. 16, 1981, at A12, col. I; Legislative
Councilagain refuses LaPlante pay, Ark. Democrat (Little Rock), Aug. 15, 1981, at BI, col. 1;
Paying $2,000for Extension Again Refused, Ark. Gazette (Little Rock), July 10, 1981, at A2,
col. 2. The legislature continued to withhold payment until after a hearing in which the dis-
trict court ordered payment "forthwith." Finney v. Mabry, No. PB-C-69-24 (D. Ark. Aug.
28, 1981); State Issues Checks to Pay LaPlante, Ark. Gazette (Little Rock), Sept. 1, 1981, at 1,
col. 1; see also Citizens' pockets picked to pay LaPlante, official says, Ark. Democrat (Little
Rock), Aug. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 1. When LaPlante returned to Arkansas to testify in the
hearing on whether the defendants finally had brought the prisons into compliance with the
court's orders, see Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Ark. 1982), the trial judge re-
fused to permit him to be compensated as an expert witness at $45 per hour. In the judge's
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cuss it. The best example of this limited deference to Newton is a well-
known school desegregation case, Hart v. Community School Board."'
In Hart, Judge Weinstein cited Newton and Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 53 as authority for the district court's discretion to determine the
amount of the master's compensation and who shall pay that compensa-
tion. 112 The court, however, did not analyze expressly the factors ex-
pressed in Newton. Rather, in a short paragraph near the end of a very
long opinion, it simply deferred the question of the amount of compensa-
tion and noted that "[p]reliminary discussions with counsel suggest that
a reasonable fee would be based upon about half that obtainable by pri-
vate attorneys in commercial matters."'" 3 In the order appointing the
special master, a law professor with expertise in housing matters," 14 the
court granted the master permission to apply from time to time for com-
pensation and reimbursement of expenses and ordered the master to keep
time records. 1
5
In one case, however, the issues of appropriate standards for setting
a master's compensation and the use of Newton were debated extensively
between the district court and its supervising circuit in a series of opin-
ions. Because they illustrate the problems in this area, these opinions are
discussed here in detail.
Reed v. Rhodes 16 involved desegration of the Cleveland, Ohio pub-
lic schools. In a ninety-page opinion, Judge Battisti of the Ohio District
view, LaPlante was merely testifying to facts he observed as a former employee of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, not as an expert. Expert Fees Are Sought for LaPlante, Ark. Gazette
(Little Rock), May 12, 1982, at B7, col. 6. LaPlante has reported that he never even received
compensation of $30 per day as a factual witness, although he was reimbursed for his transpor-
tation to prepare for and testify at the five-day compliance hearing. Personal interview with
Mr. LaPlante (March 28, 1985). I thank Mr. LaPlante for providing much of the documenta-
tion for this paragraph.
111. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affid, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 767. The court also cited a case from a neighboring district, E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
113. Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 767.
114. This master has chronicled his experiences. Berger, Away from the Court House and
Into the Field: The Odyssey ofa Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978). He does not
discuss his fees, however.
115. Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 768.
116. 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Reed I), remanded mem., 559 F.2d 1220 (6th
Cir. 1977), opinion issued after remand, 455 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ohio), remedial order entered,
455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aft'd in part & remanded in part, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980). The Cleveland desegregation effort has been called "a
textbook example of the pitfalls that even the most energetic master can encounter." Kirp &
Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institu-
tional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313, 378 (1981). For a description of the master's role in
Cleveland and the obstacles to reform in this "dinosaurian" school system, see id. at 350-51,
357-59, 363-66, 368-69, 378.
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Court found that the defendant boards of education had violated the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights by intentionally fostering and maintaining
segregated schools within the city's public school system. In the conclu-
sion to the lengthy opinion, the judge indicated that he intended to ap-
point a special master to assist the court with remedies. The judge also
announced his plans to appoint a panel to assist the special master with
input from legitimately affected interest groups. The court ordered the
parties to submit proposed instructions to the special master and sugges-
tions for the structure and membership of the panel.
117
Two weeks later, on September 14, 1976, the district court ap-
pointed a Cleveland tax attorney as special master.1 18 Two months later,
the judge substituted two experts for the panel of assistants, one to work
with the state board of education and one to work with the city board of
education.", 9 Upon the recommendation of the special master, the court
ordered the appointment of a large firm of certified public accountants to
assess the financial operations and management capabilities of the school
district. 120
In December 1977, the special master applied for interim fees for
himself and his law firm, the court appointed experts, and the public
accounting firm. Although the court initially approved these requests,
121
the court vacated its order and asked the master to update the applica-
tion. 122 The district court then reviewed the amended application with-
out taking testimony on the reasonableness of the requested fees.
However, the court required counsel for the defendants to disclose their
billings to their clients. Additionally, the court ascertained the amounts
that the state and city boards of education had been charged by other
attorneys, the same public accounting firm, and other consultants in un-
related matters. Finally, the court directed counsel for plaintiffs to sub-
mit their proposed hourly rates for work on the case. 123 The district
court ultimately entered an order for interim fees, allowing the full
117. Reed I, 422 F. Supp. at 797.
118. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 740 (6th Cir. 1979) (Reed I). The
circuit opinion reviewed the series of unpublished district court orders described here.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 742. The special master and a state auditor had found many deficiencies in the
records and procedures of the Cleveland Board. These problems, the master concluded, made
it difficult for the school board members to make knowledgeable policy decisions regarding the
desegregation process. Id. at 741.
121. The master sought $301,760 for himself and his firm as interim fees through October
31, 1977; $31,332.40 for one expert, an authority on school administration; $65,250 for the
other expert, a law professor; and $58,086 for the certified public accounting firm. Id. at 742.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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amounts requested except for the law professor expert. 124
On appeal, in Reed 11,125 the defendants did not question the time
spent by the master and his law associates. The defendants did question
the hourly rates and the total fee allowance. The Sixth Circuit quoted
extensively from the district court's memorandum opinion granting fees.
The district court had set the hourly rate of $110 per hour for the special
master by referring to the prevailing rate in the Cleveland area for legal
fees of experts in cases of this complexity. 12 6 The district court also con-
sidered the rates charged by private counsel in the desegregation case
itself.127 These rates ranged from $70 to $130 per hour, "centering" at
approximately $100 per hour.128 The circuit panel 129 acknowledged that
the district court had applied the standards set forth in Newton in deter-
mining that the payments to the special master and his law firm were
reasonable. 130 Focusing on the gross amounts, however, the court ex-
plained its reasons for concluding that the fees awarded to the master
were unreasonable and excessive.131
First, Judge Lively noted that the district court considered only the
top rates billed by Cleveland law firms, because "the special master's
work was confined to that requiring a high degree of expertise and judg-
ment."' 132 In reviewing the itemized statements, however, the appellate
court noted many hours spent "gathering information . . . telephoning
• . . [and] corresponding."' 133 These activities were not as demanding as
conducting hearings, meeting with the presiding judge and the attorneys,
or evaluating the plans ultimately submitted by the defendants. 134 More-
over, when dealing with the most difficult problems, the special master
124. The special master and his law firm received an average rate of $110 per hour. The
accounting firm requested and received $60 per hour. One expert received $40 per hour as
requested. The other expert, the law professor, requested compensation at the rate of $75 per
hour, but received $60 per hour. Id. at 742-43.
125. 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979). The Sixth Circuit discussed the fee issue in this com-
panion opinion to its opinion on the substance of the district court's findings regarding segre-
gation in Cleveland's schools. Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 935 (1980).
126. Reed II, 607 F.2d at 744.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Judge Lively wrote for a unanimous court, including Chief Judge Edwards and Judge
Engel. Id. at 737.
130. Id. at 744.
131. The district court award amounted to $300,000 per year, or $445,000 as of the cut-off
date for the interim award. Id. at 744-45.
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had the assistance of the public accounting firm and the advice of two
experts, one a nationally recognized authority on education administra-
tion and the other a constitutional law professor. 135 In addition, the rec-
ord showed that associates in the special master's law firm gathered
much of the information and attended meetings on behalf of the
master.
1 36
The circuit court did not believe that these facts justified a total dis-
allowance for any of the hours spent by the master and his firm. How-
ever, these facts were relevant in applying the principles developed by
other courts asked to set reasonable compensation in public interest
cases. 137 The court then turned to the opinion in Hart, in which the
district court pointed out that "counsel in the case had suggested 'a rea-
sonable fee would be based upon about half that obtainable by private
attorneys in commercial matters.' "138 The Reed II court panel declared
that this standard reflected a "generally accepted principle that the high-
est range of fees in private litigation is not a proper basis for compensa-
tion of masters."1 39 With little elaboration, the Reed II panel stated that
"many of the considerations which apply to the setting of attorneys' fees
in public litigation apply to setting the fees of a special master."14 Ig-
noring its own prior citation to Newton, the court declared that fair com-
135. Id.
136. Id. The circuit court noted that these associates had been admitted to the bar in 1973
and 1975, but had qualified earlier as certified public accountants.
137. Id
138. Id. (quoting Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 767).
139. Reed I, 607 F.2d at 745. In support, the panel quoted a 27-year-old opinion from
the Northern District of Ohio concerning a special master in a patent matter, Robertshaw-
Fulton Controls Co. v. Patrol Valve Co., 106 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ohio 1952), affid, 210 F.2d
146 (6th Cir. 1954). There, the trial judge had stated: "The Court sitting in equity does not
feel at liberty to allow compensation to be paid by litigants upon the same basis as might be the
case in private relationship." Id at 432, quoted in Reed II, 607 F.2d at 745-46.
140. Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746. The panel did discuss institutional reform cases establish-
ing attorney's fees by reference to the Criminal Justice Act. In the famous case of Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. (1972), modified, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), Judge
Johnson awarded attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiffs in a mental institution reform suit
on the basis of the schedule established by the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1)
(1982) (Twenty dollars per hour for out-of-court work and $30 per hour for in-court time. The
Act was amended in 1984 to provide for hourly rates not exceeding $40 for out-of-court work
and $60 for in-court work. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(d)(1) (Supp. 1985)). The panel quoted Judge
Johnson's statement that the Act's schedule established "'a reasonable basis upon which law-
yers can carry out their professional responsibility without either personal profiteering or un-
due financial sacrifice.'" Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746 (quoting Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 410). The
panel also cited Sixth Circuit Judge Weick's concurring opinion in a school desegregation case,
in which he had suggested that the schedule of attorneys' fees in the Criminal Justice Act
could be taken into account. Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746 (citing Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 576 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., concurring)).
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pensation could be determined by application of the "Hart formula of
'about half that obtainable by private attorneys in commercial mat-
ters.' ",141 Therefore, the court concluded that reasonable compensation
for the special master was $65 per hour, one-half the highest Cleveland
rate found by the district judge and about two-thirds the average rate of
experienced Cleveland trial attorneys. 142 The court approved a rate of
$40 per hour for associates in the master's law firm. 143
The Reed H panel then reviewed the awards to the other assistants
of the special master. The court had no trouble affirming an award to the
certified public accountants of $60 per hour 144 and to the educational
administration expert of $40 per hour, 145 because the defendants did not
challenge the amounts. The court had greater difficulty with the constitu-
tional law professor's fee. The panel noted that masters are used because
they possess skills and experience that the district courts frequently
lack. 146 Courts, however, are presumed to have expertise on legal issues,
including constitutional law. Further, on legal matters, courts have the
assistance of the attorneys of record and their own staffs, which include
qualified law clerks. In this particular case, additional help was available
because the United States was an amicus and had participated actively
through attorneys from the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment. 47 Thus, if the master was not qualified to make recommendations
because of a lack of experience in constitutional law, those issues should
have been submitted to the district judge.1 4 8 The use of the law professor
here, the Reed II court noted, resulted in a "partial abdication" of the
judge's role, 149 which was one of the main criticisms of the use of special
masters in nonjury cases. 150 The court, therefore, questioned whether
there had been any compensable contribution in the work of the law
professor.15'
The circuit court then reviewed the hours billed by the law profes-
sor, and concluded that approximately one-third involved activities not
141. Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746. The court rejected, without further explanation, the fee
schedule of the Criminal Justice Act because it was not "sufficient." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The trial court's $445,000 interim award accordingly was reduced to $240,358.
144. Id.





150. Id. at 747-48 (citing Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLuM.
L. REV. 452 (1958)).
151. Reed 11, 607 F.2d at 747.
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included in the statement of his appointment. Among these were re-
search and writing for the court, and meetings with the court and its
staff. The panel held that those hours should not be paid for by the de-
fendants. 152 Rather than the $60 hourly rate awarded by the district
court, the circuit panel granted the professor $50 per hour because he
was a full-time faculty member of a local law school and did not have the
overhead of a private law office. 153 The court felt that this was fair and
reasonable compensation commensurate with the $65 hourly rate al-
lowed the special master.
154
The court concluded with a reminder that "[c]ourts must never lose
sight of the fact that the fees in a case of this kind are paid from public
funds. Every effort should be made to keep these expenses as low as is
reasonably possible."' 155 The Sixth Circuit recommended fixing the fee
rate of the special master at the time of appointment and requiring sub-
mission of monthly vouchers. This procedure would give the parties the
advantage of knowing in advance the actual rate of compensation and
would make them aware of actual costs as they accrued.'
56
Two years later, the Cleveland case spawned another round of opin-
ions concerning the master's fees. In Reed v. Rhodes (Reed 111),15 7 the
district court again addressed a series of pending applications for
master's fees. Ignoring the circuit's admonition to the master to submit
monthly vouchers, these applications covered the period from March 1,
1978, to August 30, 1980.158 The court held a three-day hearing on the
matter in March 1981. The special master contended that the circuit's
Reed I opinion did not apply to the pending fee requests "because of the
differences between these and the earlier applications in, among other
factors, type of work performed, quantity of work involved, and overall
conditions." 159 The defendants objected to the master's request for com-
pensation at a rate higher than that established in Reed 11, although they
152. Id. at 748. Although the court saw another 300 hours worked as also not clearly




156. Id. The panel referred with approval to the court's practice in the Milwaukee school
desegregation case. Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 824 (E.D. Wis.),
affid sub nom. Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated & remanded on
other grounds, 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
157. 516 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (Reed II1). This opinion exclusively concerns
the special master's fee.
158. In four applications, for different portions of the time period, the master requested a
total of $548,394.21 in fees and $13,088.19 in expenses. Id. at 564.
159. Id.
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recognized that the base rates might be adjusted upward for inflation. 160
The defendants also contended that the master was not entitled to com-
pensation for any time spent in Reed 11 defending the fees previously
authorized by the district court.
61
The district court, in a remarkable display of independence, refused
in Reed III to follow literally the Sixth Circuit's Reed 11 holding. To
district court Judge Battisti, the whole issue of the appropriate compen-
sation for a special master required careful reexamination, and although
it was "not so intended," he was "aware that [his] decision may be con-
strued as a dissent to the Sixth Circuit's opinion."'' 62 The court noted
that the special master had provided quality service in an atmosphere of
hostility and recalcitrance, created primarily by the local defendants.
The defendants were not merely unable to implement school desegrega-
tion; to a great extent, they also were unwilling. 163 Thus, the master
found it much more difficult and time consuming to formulate and im-
plement an appropriate remedy. 164 After describing the various tasks
that the master had performed, 65 the judge noted that the master
brought to bear "considerable legal, financial and management
expertise."1
66
Having established the qualitative value of the master's work, the
judge turned to the question of the appropriate standard for the master's
fee. The court observed the "singular lack of case law respecting appro-
160. Id.
161. For discussion of the propriety of awarding "fees on fees" in the attorney's fee con-
text, see 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 9, 16.02[3], at 16-19 to 16-22. The defend-
ants also contended that the special master should not be compensated for any time spent by
an associate in the master's firm assisting the court in the preparation of findings on the school
board's contempt of court. Apparently, the Sixth Circuit's prior criticisms of nonjudicial per-
sonnel assisting the district judge on purely legal matters prompted this contention. See supra
text accompanying notes 144-54.
162. Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 565. The district court elaborated:
The Court is confident that it has been every bit as deliberate as the Court of Appeals
in reaching its decision. With full appreciation of the need for orderliness in the
system, and fully cognizant of the fact that it is bound by the law of the circuit, the
Court has made every effort to apply the substance of relevant principles of law,
equity, and, above all, reason.
Id.
163. Id; see also supra note 120.
164. The court declared that it knew of no other city in the country where the defendants
had been "so completely unhelpful" in implementing a desegregation order. Therefore, the
defendants had only themselves to blame for the high cost of the special master's services.
Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 565.
165. This took almost three full printed pages in the opinion to summarize. Id. at 565-68.
166. Id. at 568. The court complimented the special master for the significant benefit that
his work had provided to the school system, especially in management and finance, and to the
court, in the form of reports "which were always of the highest quality." Id.
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priate compensation for special masters in public litigation."' 67 The
court then quoted from Newton, which it called the "seminal" case in
that area.1 68 The court declared that, while it had followed Newton in its
earlier fee award, the Sixth Circuit's reversal in Reed I1 followed "a pass-
ing remark" in the Hart case. 169 Judge Battisti noted that the circuit
panel had "nonetheless opined that 'many of the considerations which
apply to the setting of attorneys' fees in public litigation apply to setting
the fees of a special master.' "170 With that statement of the Reed II
panel, the judge was "entirely in agreement."
1 71
Judge Battisti then quoted from the Kyriazi opinion, which had used
attorneys' fees awards as the rough comparison for the master's rates.
172
The district court argued that Kyriazi was distinguishable from the de-
segregation case before it because the fees in Kyriazi were set in advance
of the assumption of duties and paid by a private entity rather than from
the public coffers. 173 Thus, while Kyriazi was significant, it did not artic-
ulate appropriate fee standards for masters in public litigation.
The district court also stated that the Hart standard, even though it
had been adopted by the Sixth Circuit, was "in this Court's opinion, in-
apposite to the presently pending fee applications."'174 The court pointed
out that the master in Hart was assisting the court in the formulation of
the remedy. This was also the primary task of the special master when
the Sixth Circuit reviewed the fee application in Reed II. The primary
task facing the master during the period covered by the pending applica-
tion, however, was the implementation of the remedial order. The dis-
trict court noted that, although formulation of a remedy was not an easy
task, it was "of finite duration, manageable proportions, and. . . subject
to control."' 75 In contrast, implementation, especially with hostile de-
fendants, was "indefinite in duration, considerably more taxing on energy
167. Id.
168. Id; see supra text accompanying note 58.
169. Here, Judge Battisti quoted Judge Weinstein more fully: "Preliminary discussions
with counsel suggest that a reasonable fee would be based upon about half that obtainable by
private attorneys in commercial matters." Reed I, 516 F. Supp. at 568 n.4 (quoting Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 767 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)).
170. Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 568 n.4 (quoting Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746).
171. Reed III, 516 F. Supp. at 568 n.4
172. Id. at 568-69 (quoting Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (D.N.J.
1979)). For discussion of Kyriazi, see supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
173. The judge then, however, immediately quoted from a Third Circuit case involving the
City of Philadelphia, indicating that it should not matter whether a public or private entity
would be paying an attorneys' fees award. Reed I, 516 F. Supp. at 569 (quoting Rodriguez v.
Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1249 n.32 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978)).
174. Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 569.
175. Id.
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and resources, and far less susceptible to control by the master of time
and scheduling." 176 Therefore, a more generous fee standard was appro-
priate to assess the new application. 177
Exploring the attorney's fee analogy, the district court noted that
the Sixth Circuit, after applying the Hart formula in Reed II, subse-
quently had awarded attorneys' fees in public litigation at rates compara-
ble to the fair market value of the services. 178 The district judge regarded
an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Cope-
land v. Marshall,179 as "[b]y far the most cogent and articulate decision
setting forth an objective and rational set of criteria for determining a
reasonable attorney's fee in civil rights actions .... ,1so The Copeland
court took the approach of calculating a "lodestar" fee and then adjust-
ing for various factors, including quality of service. 18  The district court
agreed with Copeland that a lodestar, which consists of the number of
hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is
"the only reasonably objective" starting point for a court-awarded attor-
ney's fee.182 The court concluded that the lodestar method was also a
fair and reasonable basis for compensation of a special master.18 3
The district court then calculated a lodestar for the master's fee ap-
plication. The court began by estimating the number of hours reasonably
expended, and determined that it was equal to the number of hours the
176. Id. The district court relied upon a distinction drawn by Professor (and frequent
special master) Vincent M. Nathan between a "pre-decretal" master, who assists in the formu-
lation of the remedy, and the "post-decretal" master, who monitors and implements the rem-
edy. Id. (citing Nathan, supra note 8, at 428).
177. Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 569.
178. Id. at 569-70 (citing Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)). The court observed that, in order to secure the services of
competent and experienced attorneys as masters, they must be guaranteed compensation no
less than would be available to them as attorneys. Further, public litigation attorneys should
receive the same fees as attorneys doing private work to encourage the prosecution of civil
rights violations. Thus, masters, who make significant personal sacrifices in the public interest,
should not suffer an unreasonable financial sacrifice in addition. Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 570
& n.7.
179. 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane). The approach adopted in Copeland is dis-
cussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1984).
180. Reed I, 516 F. Supp. at 570.
181. Id. at 572.
182. Id. at 570 (quoting Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891 (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders v. Amer-
ican Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973))).
183. The district court also quoted a Sixth Circuit opinion for a principle similar to the
rationale of the Newton standard: "Attorneys' fee awards should be high enough to attract
competent counsel yet not so high as to provide a windfall for them." Reed lL, 516 F. Supp.
at 570 (quoting Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 576 F.2d 714, 715-16 (6th Cir. 1978)).
[Vol. 37
FEES OF SPECIAL MASTERS
master claimed.184 With respect to the hourly rate, the district court
noted the Copeland view that "the reasonable hourly rate 'is that prevail-
ing in the community for similar work.' "185 The court thought such a
standard was "easily applied" to setting a fee for public litigation attor-
neys.186 A more complicated analysis, however, was needed for special
masters because masters perform many services that are not completely
legal in nature. Because the master may do work more typically per-
formed by management consultants, financial advisors, and accountants,
the appropriate reasonable hourly rate for special masters would be the
prevailing rates for similarly experienced professionals performing simi-
lar work. Thus, there might be more than one reasonable hourly rate for
each attorney. The rates would depend upon the customary fee for the
particular type of work, the experience, reputation, and ability of the per-
son performing the work, and the level of skill necessary to perform the
duties properly.18 7
The tasks performed by the special master in this case fell into two
major categories: professional services 88 and administrative services.' 8 9
The court concluded that the master should be compensated for profes-
sional services at the rates requested for himself and for associates from
his law firm.' 90 The requested rates were comparable to the prevailing
rate in the community for lawyers of the special master's experience (ap-
proximately $150 an hour or more) and to the top rates charged by coun-
sel in Reed to the local board of education ($150 to $160 per hour). For
example, the highest rates charged by the large private firm acting as
principal counsel ranged from $130 in early 1978 to $155 in August
184. Reed III, 516 F. Supp. at 571. The court noted that the master could have claimed
many more hours than he did. For example, he did not claim time spent on Saturdays, and he
habitually rounded down to the nearest quarter-hour. The court also rejected the "bizarre"
suggestion that the special master should not be compensated for the time spent by an associ-
ate in the special master's firm who had prepared proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Id. The court handled separately another defense challenge regarding time spent on the
appeal of the fee award in Reed II. See supra text accompanying notes 125-56; infra text
accompanying notes 201-06.
185. Reed II, 516 F. Supp. at 571 (quoting Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892 (footnote omitted)).
186. Reed III, 516 F. Supp. at 571. Many commentators would disagree with the court's
premise that this standard is easy to apply in the public litigation attorney's fee context. See,
e.g., articles cited infra note 197.
187. Reed III, 516 F. Supp. at 571.
188. For example, the master conducted hearings, researched and wrote reports, and con-
ferred with counsel. The judge did not distinguish between in-court and out-of-court time, just
as the large private law firm representing the local school board did not. Id. at 572 & n.10.
189. For example, the master disposed of special transfer requests by students, arranged
meetings, and shared information with the media. Id. at 572.
190. Id. These rates ranged from $125 to $150 per hour for the special master, depending
on when the services were rendered, and from $50 to $90 per hour for associates. Id. at 564.
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1980. Moreover, those charges did not include administrative expenses
that the special master's firm absorbed, such as reproduction, postage,
and messengers. 191
With respect to administrative services, which did not require as
high a level of skill and experience, the district court determined that the
special master and his associates should be compensated at eighty per-
cent of the rates approved for professional services. The court estimated
that approximately thirty percent of the time billed was spent on admin-
istrative matters. 1
92
After calculating the lodestar, which amounted to a total of
$460,977.66, 193 the district court considered whether to make any adjust-
ments. The court referred to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. ,'19 4 which set forth twelve factors 195 rele-
vant to setting an attorney's fee in public law litigation. 196 The district
court recognized that the Johnson factors were not completely applicable
to setting fees for a special master in public litigation, because a master's
position as an agent of the court was different from that of an attorney
litigating a case. 197 Accordingly, the district court, using in part modifi-
191. Id. at 572. There was also evidence that the prevailing rates for senior associates in
the community ranged from $90 to $125 per hour. Id.
192. Id. at 572-73.
193. This figure was equivalent to an average hourly rate of $106.33. Id. at 573.
194. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The Johnson factors are considered a standard judicial
approach to calculating an attorney's fee. E.g., 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 9, 1
15.03[3]; Breger, supra note 179, at 253-54; Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty,
Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 238-
39 n.167 (1984); Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 331 (1980).
195. The twelve Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the legal questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4)
the preclusion of other employment for the attorney by the acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limits imposed by the client
or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
196. The Copeland court had stated that these factors were " 'central to any fee award.'"
Reed II1, 516 F. Supp. at 573 (quoting Copeland, 641 F.2d at 889).
197. The court might have added that the Johnson factors have been criticized in commen-
tary published before Reed 111, because the Fifth Circuit did not explain how the various
factors were to be weighed and how a court should deal with the factors that overlap and
conflict. See, e.g., Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281, 286-87 (1977); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the At-
torney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 372-73 (1980); Note, Court-Awarded "Rea-
sonable" Fees: Forcing a Segregated Public Interest Bar?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 406
(1979); Comment, supra note 194, at 376-78. The Fifth Circuit recently has attempted to give
further direction to its district courts. See 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 9,
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cations of some of the Johnson factors, established a set of factors for
adjusting the lodestar figure for a public litigation master. The new fac-
tors were "(1) The preclusion of other employment by the Master due to
acceptance of the position; (2) Time limitations imposed by the Court or
the circumstances; (3) The results obtained; (4) The undesirability of the
position; [and] (5) Awards in similar cases." 198
Applying these factors, the court first noted that the master's law
firm undoubtedly had suffered as a result of the master's diversion from
his practice. In addition, the master frequently had worked under severe
time constraints. Finally, the master's friends had advised him that ac-
cepting the position could only hurt his practice and reputation, because
the position was highly visible, controversial, and subject to constant
public scrutiny. Despite these problems, the court stated that the special
master produced excellent quality work that was greatly beneficial to the
court and to the school system. 199 Although these facts could justify up-
ward adjustment of the lodestar figure, "the court, mindful of the admo-
nition in Newton. . .that '[t]he rights of those who ultimately pay must
be carefully protected,' conclude[d] that the lodestar figure represents
reasonable compensation for the master's services. ' 2 °
The district court then turned to the defendant's contention that the
special master was not entitled to any compensation for the time spent or
the costs incurred in litigating Reed II, in which the Sixth Circuit had
reversed the fee award in Reed /2o1 The United States, however, acting
as amicus, noted that the principle that a party who loses a law suit bears
his own fees cannot be " 'neatly applied to this matter.' "202 The govern-
ment suggested that the court, in its equitable discretion, should grant
the master half of the costs incurred in unsuccessfully defending the ear-
lier fee award.20 3 The district court, however, concluded that the special
master should be fully compensated for unsuccessfully defending the ear-
lier award because the local defendants had assured the court publicly
and privately that they had no objection to the master's hourly rate, and
15.03[3], at 15-31 to -33 (1984); Note, Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 277, 339-40 n.279 (1982), and cases cited therein.
198. Reed III, 516 F. Supp. at 573 (footnote omitted). The district court noted that sev-
eral of the Johnson factors (1, 2, 3, 5, and 9) were already considered in establishing the lode-
star. The court observed that other factors, such as whether the fee was fixed or contingent,
were not relevant to the special master situation. Id. at 573 n. 11.
199. Id. at 574. The court did not examine the fifth factor, awards from other cases, be-
cause their were, as yet, few similar cases. Id at 574 n.12.
200. Id. at 574 (quoting Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (1922)).
201. Reed 1II, 516 F. Supp. at 574.
202. Id. (quoting the response of the United States to the special master's fee application).
203. Id.
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the state defendants originally had refused to assist the court in setting a
reasonable figure. 20 4 Thus, the court granted the master's request for at-
torney's fees and expenses incurred in litigating the earlier fee award.
20 5
In all, the court awarded the special master $522,900.17.206
The district court's decision in Reed III was appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which again reversed. 20 7 As background to Reed IV, Judge
Lively, again author of the unanimous opinion for the identical panel,
reviewed his prior opinion in Reed II. There, the circuit court specifi-
cally had rejected the district court's view that the special master should
be compensated at the full rates charged by experienced trial lawyers in
Cleveland. The Reed IV court reiterated that it had adopted Judge
Weinstein's conclusion in Hart and had approved hourly rates of $65 for
the special master and $40 for his associates. Further, Judge Lively said
that the circuit, in Reed II, had taken note of the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of special master's fees in Newton.20 8 The circuit's opinion held
that, in Reed III, Judge Battisti had erred in concluding that the Hart
formula was not to be applied to the second fee request. 20 9 The panel
pointed out that Reed II had recognized the abilities of the special
master, discussed his activities, and considered the rates charged by ex-
perienced local attorneys. The circuit nonetheless had concluded that
the special master should not be compensated at the same rates as exper-
ienced private attorneys. The court could find nothing in the present
record that required reconsideration of its earlier holding.
210
The circuit panel rejected the district court's idea that the work per-
formed by the period covered in the second fee application was more
204. Id. at 574-75. The state defendants had intended to appeal whatever figure the court
established.
205. Id. at 575. The special master was awarded $33,308.75 in fees and $16,975.57 in
costs and expenses for the defense of the earlier award. The latter figure included over $15,000
owed to a large private Cleveland law firm that represented the special master on the Reed II
appeal. Id. at 575 n.14.
206. Id. at 575. This was divided into $460,977 66 for professional and administrative
services, $50,284.32 for preservation and collection of fees, and $11,638.01 in out-of-pocket
expenses.
207. Reed v. Rhodes, 691 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1982) (Reed IV). The same panel that de-
cided Reed II also decided Reed IV, which was concerned exclusively with the special master's
fee.
208. Id. at 267.
209. Reed IV also noted Judge Battisti's statement that the panel in Reed II simply had
followed a "passing remark" by Judge Weinstein. Id. at 267 n. 1. The panel reminded the
district court that whether or not it had been a passing remark in Hart, it had subsequently
become the law of the circuit. Id. The panel also opined that in Hart, which it said was a
valuable treatise on special masters, nothing was written without careful consideration. Id.
210. Id. at 268.
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difficult than that covered by the first application and reviewed in Reed
II. Indeed, the work in the second period was less time consuming.
Even though the problems of implementation may have been more "tedi-
ous and vexing," the level of skill required was no greater than that in
originally fashioning the remedy.211 Although the court recognized that
Professor Nathan's article212 had distinguished between predecretal and
postdecretal work, it noted that the article did not contend that the work
of a postdecretal master was more difficult. Therefore, the panel felt that
the district judge, the master, and the plaintiffs had seized upon a distinc-
tion without a difference simply to justify the district court's great depar-
ture from the circuit's clear directives in Reed 11.213
The Reed IV panel also admonished the district court for its analogy
to rates of compensation for attorneys in public litigation. In Reed II,
the court had spoken of "considerations, not rates" that applied to set-
ting fees in that situation. 214 The circuit court explained that, in Reed 11,
it had not referred to the Attorneys Fee Award Act of 1976.215 More-
over, some of the most important elements in setting an attorney's fee
were clearly not present when setting the fee of a special master. Specifi-
cally, because the Act permits a reasonable attorney's fee only to the
prevailing party, higher fees are justified when awarded because of their
contingent nature. 216 In contrast, a master assured of a reasonable fee
faces no risk of nonpayment.
Recognizing also that the Attorneys Fee Award Act sought to as-
sure that attorneys would be willing to undertake unpopular causes, the
court observed that a special master did not run the same risk as an
attorney initiating a civil rights action. For example, the master need not
be as visible as the attorneys or the district judge because of his quasi-
judicial capacity. The circuit court observed that the special master in
this case obviously had not suffered any stigma because he still was able
to bill private clients for approximately 1,200 hours of work in each year
211. Id.
212. Nathan, supra note 8, at 428.
213. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 268.
214. Id. (quoting Reed II, 607 F.2d at 746).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
216. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 268-69. The panel quoted from a Sixth Circuit opinion that the
district court had relied upon in Reed III, Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980), cited in Reed 111, 516 F. Supp. at 570.
However, the Reed IV panel quoted from the same page in Northcross to the effect that contin-
gency was "the most significant factor. . . which at times renders the routine hourly fee
unreasonably low" in setting an attorney's fee. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 269 (quoting Northcross,
611 F.2d at 638); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432 n.5 (1983) (implying criti-
cism of Northcross).
September 1985] FEES OF SPECIAL MASTERS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
that he served as master. Moreover, although certain attorney's fee fac-
tors were not applicable to setting a master's fee, in Reed 11 the circuit
had taken into account those factors that did apply in both situations.
217
The panel also held that the district judge had erred in awarding
more than $50,000 to preserve and collect fees. The special master was
entitled to defend the original award, but once he chose to be represented
by a law firm on that matter, the court saw no justification for paying
either the master or associates in his firm for their work on the appeal.
21 8
Because the master was a client and not an attorney in Reed II, he could
not collect for the time he and his associates spent on the appeal, but only
for the attorney's fees and expenses actually incurred.
219
In place of the rejected calculations of the district court, the appel-
late court granted the special master an award based on the previously
approved hourly rates in Reed 11, adjusted by the median rate of inflation
for the period of the fee award.220 Finally, the panel ordered the master,
who had been permitted to intervene in the Reed IV appeal as a party-
appellee, to bear the costs on this appeal.
221
Calculating Masters' Fees
Fees for Work Done as Special Master
From the preceding discussion, four different approaches to the
problem of calculating special masters' fees can be discerned, particularly
in the institutional reform setting: first, unbounded discretion of the trial
court; second, application of a test, developed by the Supreme Court in
Newton, that compensation should be "liberal but not exorbitant"; third,
the Hart/Reed 11 & IV method of basing the fee on one-half of the pre-
217. The court gave as examples foreclosure from other work and the nature of the assign-
ment. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 269.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 269-70. In an otherwise scathing opinion of the work of the district court, the
circuit panel remarkably did not question that the master was entitled to reimbursement for
his unsuccessful defense of the prior award on appeal. See supra text accompanying notes 202-
06. In other areas, it is hardly free from doubt that an unsuccessful litigant will obtain court-
awarded attorney's fees from the victor. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);
Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARv. L. REv.
677 (1983).
220. The adjusted hourly rate for the special master's services was $74, with an overall
rate for the special master and his associates of $67 per hour. The court compared that to the
fees paid to the special masters in the school desegregation cases in Columbus, Ohio ($50 per
hour), Milwaukee ($50 per hour plus an office and staff services), and Boston ($200 per day for
each of four masters). Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 270 & n.3. For the master's last award, which
would cover his final six months of service, the circuit panel ordered use of the base rates of
$65 and $40 per hour, again adjusted for the median rate of inflation for the period. Id. at 270.
221. Id.
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vailing rates for commercial attorneys; and fourth, the Reed III approach
of basing the fee on some variation of the lodestar method of setting at-
torney's fees. This section evaluates each of these approaches and
presents a variation of the most promising approach, that in Reed III, as
the proposed standard for calculating special masters' fees.
Unbounded Discretion of the Trial Court
As discussed above,222 by far the most common approach to setting
special masters' fees is for the court to conclude that a figure is "accepta-
ble," "reasonable," or "fair." In these cases, the court is exercising its
discretion under Rule 53(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure223 or
its predecessors in the Equity Rules.224 By definition, unbounded discre-
tion is a standardless and therefore arbitrary method of establishing fees.
An appellate court then finds it extraordinarily difficult to review a trial
court's fee award. The parties cannot readily predict what a fee should
be when planning the future cost of litigation. The parties also find it
equally difficult to challenge such an award under an abuse of discretion
test.225 Although the wide variety of tasks that a special master may as-
sume makes it difficult to put strictures on the fees that might be
awarded, the courts clearly can improve on a method that sets fees based
on unguided discretion. Whatever the dubious merits of such an ap-
proach in purely private litigation, it is particularly inappropriate in any
litigation involving public defendants, a salient characteristic of nearly all
institutional reform litigation.
226
In fairness to the parties and to the special master, a trial court
should express carefully its reasons for setting the master's fee at a partic-
ular level. Unless the parties have stipulated to a fee-setting formula that
the court regards as fair to the master, or the master joins in the stipula-
222. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a); see supra text accompanying note 66.
224. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627 (1912);
see supra text accompanying note 66.
225. See generally Levine, supra note 1, at 789 n.160 (citing articles attempting to put
structure and limits on courts' discretion in the general context of institutional reform
litigation).
226. The delicate nature of the problem of the federal courts mandating what states shall
do with their budgets has been well described elsewhere. E.g., Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978). The Supreme Court shows no signs of retreating from
that premise. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)
(federal court cannot order remedy against state officials under state statute as interpreted by
state supreme court). See generally Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to
the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REv. 343 (1985); Shapiro, Wrong Turns The Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. Rnv. 61 (1984).
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tion,227 a judge should be painstaking in evaluating a master's fee request
and calculating a fee on the basis of rational criteria. Unbounded trial
court discretion does not ensure satisfactorily such consideration.
The Newton Factors
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Newton v. Consoli-
dated Gas Co. 228 created a fee-setting standard that continues to receive
recognition. The Newton test could be interpreted in one of two ways for
present use. First, in the more general sense, a trial court could focus on
Newton's language that "compensation should be liberal, but not exorbi-
tant. ' 229 That language is a reminder to exercise care with the limited
funds of the litigants, but provides no particular standards under which a
court can choose an appropriate level of compensation. This, of course,
is little improvement over the unbounded discretion that judges have
commonly used, mostly without reference to Newton. If used in this
fashion, Newton becomes little more than a screen for the subjective
choice of the district judge.
The second way in which Newton could have been interpreted, but
apparently has not been in the six decades since it was decided, would be
to take seriously as guidelines its comparisons to the salaries of the judici-
ary and other high state officers. 230 As the accompanying table indicates,
one can readily use the same rules of thumb as the Supreme Court did in
deciding on an outside limit for a master's fee in a particular place at a
particular time.231 The figures generated are plausible as a range of max-
imum reasonable fees. A trial court might consider referring to contem-
porary salaries in a similar fashion, particularly when setting a fee for a
master working on a per diem basis. This approach, however, necessarily
assumes that the Supreme Court intended precise results when it used the
particular offices as guidelines. More likely, the Supreme Court did not
227. Even with a stipulated fee, the court cannot abdicate its responsibility to review the
master's fee request upon the motion of a party. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
228. 259 U.S. 101 (1922); see supra text accompanying notes 53-64.
229. Newton, 259 U.S. at 104.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
231. The following table illustrates the potential application of the Newton guidelines to
modem judicial and state salaries to derive a present-day equivalent of the special master's fee
approved in Newton. The "Modern per diem" is calculated by multiplying the present salary
of the benchmark official (1980's Annual Salary) by the multiplier permitted by the Supreme
Court in Newton ($49,250 divided by the 1922 Annual Salary) and dividing by 282 days, which
the Newton Court used to the number of work days in a year. Two different rates are calcu-
lated by dividing the modern per diem by five hours and eight hours respectively. Finally, the
means are provided.
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intend such precision;232 the Court probably referred to those other sala-
ries simply to underscore the exorbitant nature of the special master's
award in Newton. Therefore, such a "precise" approach should be used
only with extreme caution. The fact that no court in sixty years has
followed this method might be telling.
The Newton opinion probably will continue to be honored in the
breach. At best, it provides only a slight check on the unfettered discre-
tion of trial courts in setting special masters' fees. In this area, a different
standard is required, which suggests further analysis of the different ap-
proaches taken by the district and circuit courts in Reed.
Half Commercial Rates (Hart and Reed 11 & IV)
One of the two careful post-Newton approaches to the special mas-
ters' fee problem is exemplified by Judge Weinstein's opinion in Hart and
the Sixth Circuit opinions in Reed II and Reed IV.233 In those opinions,
the respective courts adopted the principle that the special master should
be compensated at approximately half of the prevailing attorney's fees.
234
Unfortunately, those opinions do not indicate precisely what fee is to be
halved. In Hart, the court referred to fees "obtainable by private attor-
neys in commercial matters. ' 235 In Reed 11 and Reed IV, however, the
Sixth Circuit referred to half of the highest commercial rates billed by
Modem Five Hour Eight Hour
Office 1922 Annual Salary
a 
1980's Annual Salaryb Per Dieme Rated Ratee
Chief Justice of U.S. 14,750.00 $100,700.00 $1,192.32 $238.46 $149.04
Assoc. Justice of U.S. 14,750.00 96,700.00 1,144.96 228.99 143.12
U.S. District Judge 7,866.67 73,100.00 1,622.87 324.57 202.86
Mayor of N.Y. City 15,000.00 80,000.00 931.44 186.29 116.43
Governor of N.Y. State 10,000.00 85,000.00 1,484.49 296.90 185.56
N.Y. CL App. CJ. 10,070.00 78,750.00 1,364.85 272.97 170.61
N.Y. CL App. Assoc. J. 10,000.00 75,600.00 1,320.32 264.06 165.04
N.Y. Supreme CL J. 17,500.00 60,900.00 607.77 121.55 75.97
Mean 1 1,208.63 241.72 151.08
aSee supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
b See supra note 62.
c Calculated on the basis of the following formula, which is designed to estimate modem per diem and hourly
rates based upon the maximum allowance provided in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101 (1922):
Modem per diem = (1980's Annual Salary) X )49250 - 282 days per yeart
(1922 Annual Salary))
*Total award to special master on remand in Newton. See supra note 64 & accompanying texL
tNewton's equivalent of one year's service. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
d Calculated by dividing the "Modem per diem" by 5 hours per day, which was used in Newton, 259 U.S. at 104.
c Calculated by dividing the "Modem per diem" by 8 hours per day, in order to reflect the heavier modem work
loads (but commensurately higher salaries) of the benchmark officials.
le rates derived in this manner are comparable to contemporary commercial attomey's fees carged in New
York City. See How Firms Bill, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 27 1984, at 25, col. 4, 30-31 (partners bil from $14-260/hour,
$183 average, associates bill from S71-135/hou, $48 average).
232. The Newton Court itself cautioned that the salaries it used for comparison were not to
be taken as "a rigid standard." Newton, 259 U.S. at 106.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15, 138-43, 207-10.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15, 138-43, 207-10.
235. Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 767.
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local private attorneys.236 This potential point of confusion could make a
substantial difference in the actual fee awarded when the range of fees in
commercial matters in a particular locale varies widely.
237
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the "half com-
mercial rates" approach. In Hart, Judge Weinstein applied the "half
commercial rates" approach to a special master who was a law professor.
A law professor, like others in the academic community, has a public
service component to his or her professional obligations. A professor's
contribution of time to outside public service activities certainly is per-
mitted and often expected.238 Thus, an academic institution does not ex-
pect a professor to perform outside work that will generate income for
the institution; the institution encourages and supports faculty public ser-
vice endeavors by a variety of services and overhead expenses, such as
office space, secretarial and student research assistance, library books,
stationery, and telephone service. A law professor or other academic ap-
pointed as special master, therefore, does not need to be compensated for
general overhead or for lost profits. 239 Although an academic may accept
fees for public service work, the parties need not compensate him at rates
set as if the professor-master personally incurred the overhead expenses
of private practice.
240
236. Reed 11, 607 F.2d at 746. In Reed IV, the circuit panel instructed the district court to
apply the rates allowed in Reed 11, as adjusted for inflation. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 270.
237. In most cases, the selected rate should be at or near the upper range of the local scale
for persons of comparable experience, because anyone selected to be a master ought to be
highly skilled and accomplished. "Since the master should be a person of outstanding and
recognized competence, his compensation could be substantial." MANUEL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 3.21.
238. For example, this policy is explicit at the University of California. "A candidate for
appointment, merit increase, or promotion. . . shall be judged by the following criteria: (a)
Teaching, (b) Research and creative work, (c) Professional competence and activity, and (d)
University and public service." University of California, Handbook for Faculty Members of
the University of California 141 (1978) (quoting University of Californa, Academic Personnel
Manual § 52). "[It is] assume[d] that each [faculty member] is devoting all his time and ener-
gies (his full 'working' time) to the University. Such service to the University includes varied
types of activities, such as. . . public service." Id. app. XX, at 141 (text of University Regu-
lation No. 3, Privileges and Duties of Members of the Faculty).
239. See EEOC v. Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, 626 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (5th
Cir. 1980); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1329-30 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (modified by the court before publication); Gurule v. Wilson, 525 F. Supp. 996, 997 (D.
Colo. 1981). Moreover, because the award of a master's fee is not based on statutory author-
ity, the legislative history of attorney's fees awards statutes, which suggests that a cost-based
approach is not consistent with congressional intent, technically does not apply to awards to
masters. See Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1546-47 (1984).
240. All out-of-pocket expenses of the master or the master's home insitituion ought to be
reimbursed, however. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. at 1148 (citing Hart, 383
F. Supp. 699), for holding that fee of law professor in school desegregation case would be
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Thus, in the Hart case an initial rate based on approximately half of
local commercial rates to compensate the law professor for his service as
special master seems entirely appropriate. 241 In contrast, this approach
does not seem appropriate in the Reed situation, when the district judge
chose a private practitioner as the special master. Unlike an academic, a
private practitioner does have substantial overhead to cover. If an ap-
pointee is in practice with others, many people might depend on the fees
that the appointee can generate, in order to pay a share of the overhead
that permits the law firm to function.242 If a judge appoints a private
practitioner as special master, then it is only fair to compensate not only
for that practitioner's time, but also for his foregone contribution to the
firm's minimum operating expenses. Thus, while the Hart court might
appropriately have adopted the half commercial rate standard for its situ-
ation, it is not valid for Reed.
The circuit court was too quick to adopt the Hart standard in Reed
II. By the time it had an opportunity to review the matter in Reed IV,
the court seemed more interested in admonishing the district judge to
follow the law of the circuit and of the case than in rethinking the ques-
tion in light of Judge Battisti's careful analysis in Reed III.
In sum, the "half commercial rates" approach is an appropriate
starting point when the potential special master is someone, such as a
professor supported by a university, who has no need to generate income
directly to cover the overhead expenses of the institution. In such a case,
the Hart formula would be reasonably easy to apply and the award sim-
ple to establish; it provides a measure that can be determined by evidence
presented to the court through affidavits. The "half commercial rates"
about half that charged by attorneys in private practice, but all overhead costs paid. Some law
firms would absorb many expenses and build their cost into the hourly rates. See Reed III, 516
F. Supp. at 572-73; Hildebrandt, Billing and Cash Flow II, in LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT 89, 91 (1977).
241. The initial "half commercial" rate may be adjusted up or down under the same con-
siderations as are appropriate when adjusting the practitioner-master's lodestar rate. See infra
text accompanying notes 251-77.
242. One recent estimate of annual overhead in large corporate firms is $50,000 per law-
yer. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS 376 (1983). Another estimate is that 40-60% of a lawyer's
gross income is absorbed by the costs of practice. Moldenhauer & McMenamin, Fees and
Billing, in THE LAWYER'S HANDBOOK C3-5 (rev. ed. Supp. 1980). The United States Depart-
ment of Justice has suggested that a fee award set at twice an attorney's hourly salary, not
billing rate, will generally "provide reasonable compensation and cover normal overhead ex-
penses." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS TO PROPOSED LEGAL FEES
EQUITY ACT, S. 2802, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 18 (1984); see also Equal Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982));
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND
OTHER EXPENSES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT.
September 1985] FEES OF SPECIAL MASTERS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
approach is surely within the general dictate of Newton that compensa-
tion should be "liberal but not exorbitant." It is not, however, a feasible
approach for cases in which the special master comes from private
practice.
Lodestar (Reed III)
Even though it was rejected by the supervising circuit, the most
promising approach for cases in which the special master practices with a
private law firm is the careful treatment found in Reed 111.243 In that
case, Judge Battisti attempted to take advantage of the work done by
many judges since Newton in an area that did not exist at that time-
court-set attorney's fees.
Judge Battisti's approach adhered closely to attorney's fees stan-
dards. He began by establishing a lodestar, which was calculated by
multiplying a reasonable hourly rate times the number of hours reason-
ably expended. Then he took into account the fact that special masters
perform a large variety of services by dividing the master's time into the
categories of professional and administrative services. A master's ser-
vices should be divided roughly in this fashion, because not all of the
master's work requires the knowledge and experience of a senior attor-
ney.244 Because discretion is vested in the trial judge, and precisely cate-
gorizing and assessing the market value of particular services is difficult,
Judge Battisti's dichotomy and suggested rate differential seem sensi-
ble.245 Obviously, other systems could be devised, but this one is opera-
ble in a variety of cases. The master would be able to divide his bill into
different categories if he knew in advance that the judge would be making
such a division. The computerized billing systems that virtually all firms
243. See supra notes 157-206 & accompanying text.
244. The recognition of this fact is consistent with a leading attorney's fee opinion written
by Judge Grady in In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Il. 1983). At an
early point in the case when setting guidelines for any potential attorney's fee award, Judge
Grady put the plaintiffs on notice that, should they prevail on the merits and an award of
attorney's fees be warranted, he would apply certain standards in reviewing the bills. Partners
would be compensated at partner rates for work that could be done only at that high level of
skill. Work that could be done by more junior people, such as routinely reviewing documents
or doing basic research, would be compensated at appropriately lower rates, regardless of who
actually performed it. Id. at 933. For an empirical study of lawyers' reactions to Judge
Grady's widely publicized order, see T. WILLGING, JUDICIAL REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES: BEGINNING THE PROCESS AT PRETRIAL (1984); see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 591-93 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming trial court's reductions of certain partner
and associate charges to lower levels); 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 9, q 16.03[l 1]
("[IT]he appellate courts have, with an uncommon degree of consistency, held that it is permis-
sible to award different rates for different tasks.").
245. See supra text accompanying note 192.
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now have easily could be adjusted to split bills into the established cate-
gories for review and payment.
With respect to the reasonableness of the hours expended, it is diffi-
cult to second-guess a master. In Reed III, the trial court found that the
number of hours reasonably expended was in fact equal to the number of
hours claimed. 246 A master's time expenditure is heavily influenced by
the parties' choices to litigate or to cooperate in particular ways. 2 4 7 Ex-
cept in the fairly rare cases of abuse that must be guarded against,248 the
master's assessment of hours expended should be deemed reasonable.
Although a judge should consider seriously any precisely focused chal-
lenge to a portion of the master's hours, this factor should not be a major
problem in most cases.
Judge Battisti continued his analogy to the attorney's fee cases by
creating a list of factors based upon those established by the Fifth Circuit
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.249 The judge used or adapted
those factors that, in his view, applied to special masters in public litiga-
tion, and that could be used to adjust a lodestar figure.250 It is not clear,
however, if all of these modified Johnson factors should apply to a special
master who is compensated using a lodestar rate.
Preclusion of Other Employment
The first adjustment factor is whether a special master's appoint-
ment precludes other employment. Although the Johnson case did name
this factor, it might not apply to masters. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit
was faced with an attorney who had taken on a case in the expectation of
being paid only if he was successful, and who was precluded from other
paying legal employment in the interim.251 In the case of a master paid
under a lodestar formula, however, compensation always is guaranteed.
Therefore, even if there is preclusion of other employment, the master
246. This assessment was partially disputed by the Sixth Circuit in Reed IV. See supra
text accompanying notes 218-19.
247. It may also be difficult to determine which efforts ultimately will prove productive.
Cf. In re "Agent Orange' Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (modi-
fied by the court before publication) (describing potential need to pursue blind alleys in the
creative art of litigation).
248. See, eg., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1701, 1702 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (Master billed parties for 60 hours of time of a summer law clerk who did research on a
motion to intervene.); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Hall, 76 F.2d 258, 264-65 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935) (ordering partial return of award because master billed for 447
days of "utterly wasted" time).
249. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); see supra text accompanying note 195, 198.
250. See supra text accompanying note 197-98.
251. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
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rarely should be entitled to receive additional compensation for having to
forego other work.
25 2
An increase from the lodestar under the preclusion of employment
factor should not be permitted unless the other policy reason behind this
factor, unexpected loss of business resulting from a conflict of interest,
253
is demonstrated by the master. Attorney's fee rates, which are the basis
for a lodestar rate, already take into consideration the general risk that,
under professional responsibility rules, representing one client might pre-
clude accepting other clients. There is no reason to compensate a master
for this factor routinely when this risk already is built into the prevailing
local attorney's rates.
One might possibly justify applying the preclusion factor when an
attorney appointed as a special master is forced to close a practice tempo-
rarily during an extended appointment. In such a situation, it is reason-
able to supplement the master's compensation to take into account the
lost business during the transition period required to reestablish a prac-
tice after the appointment ends. During that period, the master would
not be serving the court, but nevertheless, would not have a series of fee-
generating legal matters "in the pipeline. ' 254 In this rare instance, the
court might consider a form of severance pay as a supplement for preclu-
sion of employment during a short, but reasonable, transition period.
Otherwise, such an increment is not justified.
Time Limitations Imposed
Experience has shown that special masters frequently have to work
under difficult time constraints. The work may require meeting people at
inconvenient hours, such as evenings and weekends. 25 5 The court also
may impose deadlines that will require the master to work long hours
252. In Reed IV, the circuit noted that the Reed special master was not precluded from
other work-he was able to bill 1200 hours to other clients, which constitutes a substantial
percentage of an average attorney's billings in one year. 691 F.2d at 269; see Hildebrandt,
supra note 240, at 89; Moldenhauer & McMenamin, supra note 242, at C3-4. This point is
consistent with other cases in which the courts have refused to grant increased compensation
in the attorney's fee context when counsel is engaged in other contemporaneous litigation. See
cases cited in Comment, supra note 194, at 360 n.137.
253. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
254. See infra note 277; cf. Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. Del.
1978) (small firm awarded increased attorney's fee under preclusion factor because prosecuting
civil rights suit on contingent fee basis created "cash flow problems"), affid, 594 F.2d 854 (3d
Cir. 1979).
255. In Reed II, the district court mentioned the master's frequent Saturday work. 516
F. Supp. at 571; see also Berger, supra note 114, at 712-21 (describing special master's meetings
at various times and locations).
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without being able to control the schedule. For example, in a school
desegregation case, a court might appoint a special master during the
summer, when time is of the essence to implement a plan for the coming
school year. Another example is a prison case, in which extremely dan-
gerous conditions might require sudden emergency work. As with attor-
ney's fees, however, this factor should not be applied in the absence of
truly extraordinary time constraints. 25 6  Attorney's fees are already
priced at a premium in part because work occasionally must be done on
short notice and at inconvenient hours. As with attorneys, there seems
no reason to increase regularly a master's lodestar for this factor.
The Results Obtained
In the attorney's fee context, the results factor has taken on in-
creased importance because of the emphasis given to it by the Supreme
Court of the United States.257 Even with its enhanced importance for
attorney's fees, the results- obtained factor should rarely be applied to a
special master's fee. In general, the results-obtained factor will be used
to reduce an attorney's fee award because the plaintiff has expended time
and effort on unsuccessful claims. Special masters do not have compara-
ble control of the course of litigation. The results obtained depend less
on the master's judgment than on factors usually outside of his control.
One could imagine, however, rare cases in which it is clear that the spe-
cial master has done poor work or wasted substantial time25 or, alterna-
tively, cases in which the master's extraordinary talents and hard work
have engineered a result not otherwise obtainable.2 59 In those unusual
256. Neely v. City of Grenada, 77 F.R.D. 484, 486 (N.D. Miss. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980); Comment, supra note 194, at 371-72.
257. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548 n.14 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 435-40 (1983). See generally Powell, The Effects of Hensley v. Eckerhart on the Award of
Attorney's Fees, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (1980); Note, Attorney's Fees-How Much Can a
Partially Prevailing Plaintiff Recover in a Civil Rights Action?, 59 TUL. L. REv. 473 (1984);
Note, Civil Rights-The Supreme Court's Test Under Section 1988- Hensley v. Echerhart, 20
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485 (1984); Attorney's Fees, 34 DRAKE L. REv. 241 (1984).
258. See, e.g., Reed I, 607 F.2d at 747-48 (reducing award because appointment of an
expert on law was abdication of court's role); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 315 F.2d 162, 165
(2d Cir. 1963) (reducing $3500 fee awarded by district court to $1500, when report was one
year late and prepared in haste); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Hall, 76 F.2d 258, 262 (8th Cir.)
(Master claimed to have spent 447 days studying record preparatory to returning findings of
fact and conclusions of law that the master, after being reduced to an examiner, was no longer
required to write.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935).
259. See, eg., Levine, Ewing & Levine, The Use of Law for Prevention in the Public Inter-
est, in Communities: Contributions from Allied Disciplines 45-48 (L. Jason ed. forthcoming
1986; manuscript on file with The Hastings Law Journal) (discussing excellent results achieved
by a skillful special master); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,, 611 F. Supp.
1296, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (modified by the court before publication) (rhetorically suggesting
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situations, a court might consider decreasing or increasing a special
master's lodestar. Normally, however, this factor should not lead to an
adjustment from the lodestar.
The Undesirability of the Position
As with the other factors Judge Battisti culled from Johnson, unde-
sirability of the position should not be a frequent reason for upward ad-
justment of a master's fee. The undesirability factor permits a court to
compensate an attorney for the adverse economic impact on his practice
arising, for example, from community hostility toward prosecution of
particular civil rights claims.26° The applicability of this variable will
depend heavily on the facts. In some situations, such as the extreme hos-
tility in the Cleveland school desegregation case, a court might justify a
fee enhancement for undesirability. In other situations, the special
master may be more accepted and will not risk a loss of economic oppor-
tunities because of the undesirability of the assignment.
261
Another reason not to adjust the special master's fee for undesirabil-
ity of the assignment is that special masters frequently are hired from a
distant locale so that they will possess the required disinterested view-
point.262 A master appointed from another community, and who will
return there after being discharged, is probably not economically vulner-
able to the undesirability of a case. In contrast, an attorney who takes on
the propriety of applying a multipler of 10 or more in a statutory attorney's fee award where
counsel skillfully negotiated a complex settlement at a very early stage); When the Court
Awards Fees, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at S2, col. 2 (reporting that Second Circuit Judge Mans-
field, in remarks at Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference on Aug. 15, 1984, advocated generously
rewarding reasonable early settlements with a fee multiplier of five to ten).
260. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (1974) (Civil
rights attorneys face hardships because of their desire to help the civil rights litigant.); Tasby v.
Wright, 550 F. Supp. 262, 282 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (The Court should recognize the hardship 12
years of proceedings have imposed on counsel.); Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp.
1231, 1233 (D.S.D. 1979) (Public reaction to sex discrimination case could have adverse eco-
nomic impact on attorney's future practice.).
261. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 859 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (Although reac-
tion of the community was unpleasant, adverse economic impact on attorney's practice was
not established.), modified on other grounds, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). A further problem
is that the adverse impact may not be known until after the special master is discharged and
returns to private practice. Probably the best a court can do is to make an estimate based on
the community reaction during the master's appointment.
262. For example, Vincent M. Nathan, who has served as master in prison cases in Ohio,
Georgia, Texas, and New Mexico, has his private practice in Toledo, Ohio. Stephen LaPlante,
the compliance coordinator of the Arkansas prison litigation, see supra note 110, moved from
California to accept the position. He returned to California after the defendants were able to
obtain the termination of his appointment. Sue Gant, master in Gary W. v. Louisiana, 429 F.
Supp. 711 (E.D. La. 1977), afl'd, 622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981), came from New York. Personal Interview with Sue Gant (May 22, 1982).
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an unpopular cause in his or her home town may have to live with the
aftermath of that decision.
Awards in Similar Cases
As with attorney's fees, special master fee awards in similar cases
both within and without the court's jurisdiction can be instructive, but
are not binding.263 The precedents traced here demonstrate that special
masters' fees frequently have been calculated in a less than precise fash-
ion. Unless a court refers to an opinion with a reasonably careful calcu-
lation,264 the views of judges in other cases should be accepted gingerly.
Fee awards in other cases can be informative; it is better practice, how-
ever, for the court to take evidence on the hourly rates prevalent in the
local community265 and then to compute an appropriate master's fee on
that basis. This practice is more sound than relying on haphazardly set
fees in other cases from other locations at other times.
In sum, the additional factors Judge Battisti developed in Reed III
as a modification of the Johnson factors will, in all probability, rarely lead
to adjustment of the lodestar figure selected as the tentative compensa-
tion for the master.266 Nevertheless, there might be other factors that
should be taken into account.
263. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41, 46 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Comment, supra note
194, at 376.
264. E.g., Reed II, 516 F. Supp. 561; Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141
(D.N.J. 1979).
265. When a master is not from the local area, the court also should take into considera-
tion the master's own usual and customary professional fees. Cf. Cunningham v. City of Mc-
Keesport, 753 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 1985) (Trial court erred in applying rate other than
hourly rate regularly charged by attorneys in question.); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751
F.2d 562, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1984) (In figuring attorneys' fees, rates from attorneys' own commu-
nities were applied.); Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees 33, reprinted
in 771 F.2d 5, 5-49 (1985) (recommending forum rate, even for out of town attorneys, except
when special expertise is needed or local counsel are unwilling to handle the matter).
266. Thus in Reed III, Judge Battisti declined to adjust the special master's lodestar for
the factors that the judge himself developed. The court noted that the master's firm suffered,
he worked under severe time constraints, he produced work of excellent quality, and he ac-
cepted the position against advice that his reputation and practice would be hurt. The judge
acknowledged that these facts would justify an upward adjustment from the lodestar, but he
declined to make an adjustment because he was "mindful of the admonition in Newton...
that '[t]he rights of those who ultimately pay must be carefully protected.'" Reed III, 516 F.
Supp. at 574 (quoting Newton, 259 U.S. at 105). The court's refusal to enhance the lodestar is
consistent with a more recent Supreme Court opinion suggesting, in the attorney's fee context,
that the lodestar will generally not be adjusted upward. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541,
1549 (1984).
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Proposed Modifications to the Lodestar Approach
Factors other than those enumerated in Johnson, and even beyond
those developed in Reed III, should be considered before a lodestar figure
is regarded as final. Several adjusting factors are proposed and analyzed
here.
Contingency and Delayed Payment
Contingency is a factor dismissed as not relevant in Reed 111. A
special master's work on behalf of a court is not of a contingent na-
ture.267 Assuming a good faith effort, a master will be paid regardless of
the outcome of the case. Thus, the contingency factor applied in attor-
ney's fees cases should be excluded from the consideration of a master's
compensation.
A related factor, however, does enter into the calculus. A master
may be paid promptly, or he or she may endure a long delay before being
paid. For example, in the Reed case the master twice sought to recover
for time expended more than two years in the past.268 In contrast, mas-
ters often have been permitted to obtain fees on an interim basis in other
cases. 269 Unlike an attorney in a fee-shifting context, the master is not
required to wait until the end of a case before getting paid. In a situation
in which the master will be paid promptly, it is reasonable to discount
the rate of a master's fee to take into account prompt payment. Thus,
when parties are ordered to deposit money with a court in advance to
cover a master's projected fees, and the court controls the disburse-
ments,270 a slightly lower hourly rate may be appropriate because the
master will be paid promptly. In economic terms, the present value of
the money is greater than if the master had to wait for a substantial
amount of time before receiving compensation. If a long delay were fore-
seeable, such as when the parties consistently delayed in making pay-
ments to the master or when the court ordered that the master not be
paid for a period of time, then the master could justify a higher rate to
267. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 269.
268. Reed I1, 607 F.2d at 742; Reed 11, 516 F. Supp. at 564.
269. E.g., Reed IV, 691 F.2d 266; Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.) (ordering
interim deposit on fees), modified in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983); United States ex rel. Chamberlin Metal Weather Strip Co. v. Madsen Constr. Co.,
6 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 567 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
270. This procedure is recommended by the National Institute of Corrections. NAT'L
INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL MASTERS (JUDI-
CIAL VERSION) 29 (1983) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL MASTERS]. This
handbook contains a wealth of practical information for special masters and judges, including
sample orders of reference, budgets, and itemized expense vouchers.
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take into account the time value of money.271
In establishing a prospective fee schedule, therefore, a court should
provide that, if the master is not paid within a certain limited period after
presenting bills to the defendants, such as thirty to sixty days, then the
master should receive a premium rate to account for the lost time value
of the money. Obviously, the built-in delay premium will depend on cur-
rent rates of inflation. In a time of low inflation, and therefore low inter-
est rates, the money's net present value will be less than in a time of
higher inflation.272 Imposing a penalty for delay of payment will, of
course, also give the parties incentive to pay the master promptly. Given
the resentments that might exist, such an incentive may be necessary.
On the other hand, if large amounts of the parties' funds are deposited in
advance for payment of the master's fees, then the money should be
placed in an interest-bearing account to give the parties the same time
value of their money. They will ultimately need to deposit less in the




Another factor that has not been widely considered is that a special
master appointment may be highly desirable. The days of Master Elde
271. This principle was recognized in at least one older master's fee case. Jesup v. Wa-
bash, St. L. & P. Ry., 94 F. 20, 21-22 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1899) (The special master received
interest from the time of his original award because the decree was appealed, and all matters,
including payment of costs, were reversed. Responsibility for the master's fee shifted from the
appellant to the appellee.). For cases discussing awarding interest or adjusting the lodestar for
delay in payment of attorneys' fees, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583 (3d
Cir. 1984); Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 129 (1st Cir. 1984); Spain v. Mountanos, 690
F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1982); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 920 (1st Cir. 1980); Gates
v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1279 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted, 636 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981).
272. Cf. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 270 (increasing permissible hourly fees by the median rate of
inflation over period since base rates established). One convenient reference for estimating the
inflation factor is the notice distributed to all federal judges by the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982), calculating inter-
est on civil money judgments. The rate is set at the coupon issue yield equivalent of the
average accepted auction price for 52 week United States Treasury bills. This variable stan-
dard is inflation-sensitive. Another appropriate reference is the Consumer Price Index
("CPI"), which is published by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics. For discussion of how
to apply the CPI in the attorney's fee context, see Swanson, Court-Awarded Legal Fees: How
They Can be Determined, TRIAL, Aug. 1985, at 51, 52. An alternative way of handling this
problem would be for the master to establish a line of credit at a bank, with the parties respon-
sible for paying the interest charged. Any delay in payment would be the parties' direct
expense.
273. Cf In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296,1328-29 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (modified by the court before publication) (total attorney's fees and expenses paid from
interest earned on settlement fund for class action matter).
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chasing the Lord Chancellor with a basket of money to obtain his ap-
pointment are surely past.274 However, a substantial element of honor
and prestige attends a court appointment to assist in a difficult and com-
plicated matter. Although desirability is difficult to quantify, a court
should consider it as a basis for discounting the hourly rate. An appoint-
ment from the Supreme Court of the United States, for example, would
warrant such a discount for desirability. 275 An attorney's future practice
might well be enhanced by such a prestigious appointment. 276 Other sit-
uations might warrant a lessor, or even no, discount for desirability.
277
Professional Responsibility
A final consideration suggests that full "retail" rates need not al-
ways be paid to masters: attorneys are under professional responsibility
obligations to perform some work pro bono or at reduced fees, and to
assist the courts in the administration of justice.2 78 Appointment as a
special master surely qualifies as such service to the courts and the ad-
ministration of justice.
In sum, there are several reasons why a master's lodestar fee fre-
quently should be adjusted downwards to a degree. There are few rea-
274. See supra note 17.
275. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1701 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
276. Cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1330 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (modified by the court before publication) (Law professors' participation as plaintiffs'
counsel may have enhanced their teaching skills.).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussion of Kyriazi v. Western Electric
Co.). In the nonremedial context, there should be little or no discount when, for example, a
special master is appointed to supervise acrimonious parties in an otherwise routine discovery
matter. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Plumbers' Union, 657 F.2d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (discovery special master recommended "in view of the
exceptional circumstances created by the past performances of counsel"); Park-Tower Dev.
Group, Inc. v. Goldfeld, 87 F.R.D. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Special master was appointed to
supervise discovery when "plaintiffs were acting somewhat as though they thought themselves
in charge of the American Forces in World War II, and the ... defendants were responding
as though they were partisan guerilla fighters."). As a final example, one attorney who has
served as special master in prison reform cases from several states, has a practice that has
become heavily devoted to his masterships. See Pollock, Q: What's a Toledo Lawyer Doing in
a Georgia Prision? A: Running it, AM. LAW., June 1983, at 97. If however, such a person
desired to return to a standard private practice, he might have substantial difficulty reestablish-
ing important contacts with commercial clients. See supra text accompanying note 254. When
a master is appointed to a case beyond the focus of his or her commercial practice, probably no
discount for desirability is warranted.
278. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (D.N.J. 1979) (mas-
ters accepted less than normal rates as part of obligations as members of the court's bar);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 comment (1983) ("The ABA House of
Delegates has formally acknowledged 'the basic responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the
practice of law to provide public interest legal services' without fee, or at a substantially re-
duced fee, in one or more of the following areas: ... the administration of justice.").
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sons that justify increasing the lodestar rate. Nevertheless, in view of the
high quality of the people one would expect to be appointed as special
master,279 the hourly rate used to establish the initial lodestar rate should
be quite generous. In most cases, this rate should be at or near the top
local hourly rates for attorneys of comparable experience. If a court
chooses to adjust their lodestar modestly according to the principles dis-
cussed here, it should nevertheless recognize the general principle from
Newton that compensation should be liberal, but not exorbitant.
Although .the standards discussed here might be discomforting to
some current masters because they suggest that fees should be re-
duced,280 they should be applied only when a court has not established
already the terms and conditions of a master's compensation. It is one
matter for a court to set a fee at a particular level that might or might not
be at the attorney's customary billing rate, if it does so before a special
master starts to serve, or when a master has agreed to leave compensa-
tion undecided until a later date. It is considerably different for a court
suddenly to impose such conditions retroactively on an ongoing master-
ship when a higher rate previously had been established. In all likeli-
hood, attorneys will consent to serve as special masters at rates
established according to the proposed method if they know the accepted
fee schedule in advance, even if the rates are lower than their customary
fees.
Compensation for Unsuccessfully Defending a Fee Award
In general, in the context of a statutory award of attorney's fees, no
fee can be awarded to an unsuccessful litigant. 281 A major assumption
behind virtually all statutory attorney's fee-shifting schemes is that only
prevailing parties are eligible for fees.282 The Supreme Court has re-
cently emphasized the principle that the amount of a fee award must be
279. See supra note 237.
280. On the other hand, some masters might find that they are being paid substantially
below market rates as a result of the common standardless approach to setting their fees. A
non-scientific survey by this author revealed a great variation in masters' fees. The author
contracted all masters whose addresses are listed in the Handbook for Special Masters. See
HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL MASTERS, supra note 270. All of these masters served in prison
cases. Those masters who responded to letters of inquiry reported having served recently or
presently serve at hourly rates ranging from $21.50 to $150 per hour. In 1984, a special master
in an original docket matter was paid $200 per hour. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1701
(1984). A special master in a hazardous waste case is currently receiving $250 per hour. Legal
Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 1, 8, col. 3.
281. See, eg., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
282. For discussion of the concept of prevailing party, see, e.g., 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART
& J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70[4], at 1306-12 (2d ed. 1985).
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strictly related to the degree of the plaintiff's success on the merits283
when the statutory authority for fee shifting refers expressly to "the pre-
vailing party.
'284
The same concept does not apply to special masters. Unlike attor-
ney's fees, which the Supreme Court of the United States has held are not
within the federal courts' power to grant absent statutory authority or
extremely limited special circumstances, 285 special masters' fees currently
are left to the discretion of the federal district court. There is no concept
analogous to "prevailing party" in the basic authority for the payment of
masters' fees.
286
More fundamentally, there is a difference in roles between attorneys
and special masters. An attorney who has taken on a civil rights case
understands the risk that he or she may lose, either at trial or on appeal.
The fee structure, as established by the Johnson factors, recognizes this
fact and provides, theoretically at least, a bonus for the contingent nature
of the cases. In contrast, special masters bear virtually no risk of non-
payment. A master, as an officer of the court, should be paid for work
that is done within the confines of the appointment. As discussed above,
the master should neither receive a bonus for contingent work nor bear
the risk that payment will not be made.
28 7
In one situation, there is a risk of nonpayment. When it arises, the
master must defend the fee award if he or she is to have any realistic
chance of being paid. When an appeal is brought by a party who opposes
a trial court's award, there is no one but the master to litigate in defense
of the award. A nonappealing party who does not have to pay the fee
award has no direct incentive to expend resources to defend the master's
award, and the judge is obviously in no position to defend the award
personally. By default, then, that task falls to the master.288
283. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
284. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982) (Title II, discrimination in public accomoda-
tions); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (Title VII, employment discrimination).
285. Alaska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
286. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a).
287. The unique status of the master's fee is recognized to some degree in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: The master shall not retain his report as security for his compensa-
tion; but when the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it
after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled to a writ of
execution against the delinquent party. Id.
288. Thus, in Reed IV, the master was permitted to intervene in the appeal of the fee
award. Reed IV, 691 F.2d at 269; see also 5A J. MOORE AND J. LucAS, supra note 8, q
53.04[2]. The special master might be able to secure representation from the United States
Attorney in the local district, if he obtains approval from the Department of Justice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 516-17 (1982) and 28 C.F.R. § 50 (1985). See, e.g., Falkowski v. EEOC, 719
F.2d 470, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Berman, Intergrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liabil-
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Thus, the master is forced out of the role of disinterested court ap-
pointee and into the role of a litigant with a property interest to protect.
The master is thrust into this situation, however, only because he or she
has agreed to serve the court and now must defend a court order that
ordinarily would be defended by a party. Therefore, treating the master
as an ordinary litigant or an attorney for purposes of allocating the ap-
peal expenses is unfair.
Because the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion,
28 9
the master will lose an appeal of a fee award only when the lower court
has erred grievously. If the lower court has carefully considered how the
master's fee should be calculated, and if the fee is established before the
master begins work so that all parties are informed about projected costs,
the master should win almost any appeal of a fee award. The expense of
the appeal should be awarded to the prevailing master as a matter of
course. Thus, this expense allocation issue should rarely arise.
Appellate courts should nevertheless be prepared to deal with the
problem. Until more appellate courts adopt explicit standards for the
calculation of masters' fees, a master can still lose part or all of a fee
awarded by even the most conscientious lower court. Although some
check on the master's ability to shift the cost of an unsuccessful defense
of a fee award is necessary, the prevailing party standard is not appropri-
ate for the reasons discussed above. Instead of creating a completely new
formula, a circuit court could analogize to the Supreme Court's test for
awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.290
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,291 the Supreme Court held
that a prevailing defendant could be awarded attorney's fees only if "the
ity, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1775, 1192-93 (1977). If the Justice Department declines representa-
tion when, for example, there is a conflict of interest, the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts potentially has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 463 (1982) to pay some
or all of the costs of legal representation. See also Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, I-C Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, ch. XI, part E (March 2, 1984) (regu-
lations governing legal representation) (copy on fie with The Hastings Law Journal). None of
these statutes and regulations refer expressly to special masters. Upon request of the district
court, however, the Administrative Office advised that it generally "would be inclined to re-
quest representation. . . should a special master be sued for actions taken in his or her official
capacity." Letter from Assistant General Counsel David N. Adair, Jr. to author (Oct. 18,
1985) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal). It is unclear what the Administrative
Office's position would be if a master were to request representation to defend an appeal of a
fee award. A special master should examine the statutory alternatives before looking to the
parties for reimbursement of attoney's fees in the manner suggested here.
289. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
291. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,
even though not brought in subjective bad faith. ' 292 For special masters,
an analogous standard is appropriate: the master should be entitled to
his attorney's fee on appeal, even if the circuit court reverses the district
court's original award for abuse of discretion, unless the master's posi-
tion crossed the Christiansburg line. Thus, only in the most extreme
cases should a special master not receive his expenses on appeal for de-
fending a trial court's fee award. Analogous policies to those that
prompted the Supreme Court to adopt a fairly extreme test in Christians-
burg apply to this situation. Masters would be encouraged to accept ap-
pointments, and would be reimbursed for the expenses of even
unsuccessful defenses of the fee awards, except in the most extreme in-
stances. 293 This would balance the masters' need to defend their fees and
the parties' interest in not bearing the cost of the masters' defense of an
utterly unreasonable award.
Once again, the Reed case provides an excellent example. 294  In
Reed II, the special master was partially unsuccessful in defending the
fee award granted in Reed I. Nevertheless, in Reed III, the district court
awarded expenses, including attorney's fees, for the master's defense of
the original award, and in Reed IV, the circuit court upheld the concept
of shifting such expenses.
In Reed IV, however, the Sixth Circuit court strongly rejected the
attempt by the special master and the district court in Reed III to distin-
guish between pre- and post-decretal work as a means of differentiating
the value of the work in the first and the later master's fee requests. The
circuit saw this as a blatant attempt to evade the rule it established in
Reed II. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the circuit court
held that the special master had to pay the costs of the unsuccessful ap-
peal in Reed IV. A court could view the master's position in Reed IV, in
which he defended an award from a trial court that had accepted his
theory of how to ignore the law of the case and the law of the circuit, as
crossing the Christiansburg line, because it was "frivolous, unreasonable
or without foundation." Under these extreme circumstances, denial of
292. Id. at 421; accord Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (applying standard to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 awards). See generally the following student notes and commentaries on Chris-
tiansburg: Note, Attorney's Fees in Title VII Actions: Applying the Christiansburg Standard for
Awards Against the EEOC, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 881 (1984); Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights
of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wls. L. REV.
207 (1976); 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 487 (1979); 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 318 (1978).
293. This generous standard should also serve to discourage appeals of fee awards, which
supports the policies of prompt and sure payment to masters.
294. See supra notes 161, 201-05, 218-19 & accompanying text.
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an award for the unsuccessful defense expenses would be justified. In
contrast, in Reed I, which was also an unsuccessful defense of a master's
award appeal, the master could not be accused of being unreasonable or
frivolous. The circuit had not yet established a rule, and the district court
obviously had considered the issue of an appropriate fee with care.
295
Thus, the different treatment of the master's expenses for the unsuccess-
ful appeal defenses in Reed II and Reed IV can be harmonized.
There remains the problem, discussed in Reed IV, of whether a spe-
cial master who has hired outside counsel to defend the fee appeal is
entitled to recover for both the counsel's fees and his or her own time.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished between the two, and stated that the
master was entitled to recover for the costs of the appeal in Reed II for
outside counsel fees, but not for his own time in the appeal. In the
court's view, the master had taken on the status of a client and was no
longer acting as the special master. This rule is too strict. The special
master should have ready access to outside counsel, which the Sixth Cir-
cuit's rule does encourage. If the master is permitted to hire outside
counsel, he or she will not be distracted from the primary mission: serv-
ing as special master and doing the work that was the original purpose of
the appointment. If the master is diverted by defending the fee award,
then the limited time available will of necessity not be spent on the origi-
nal task.
296
The Sixth Circuit's refusal to permit payment for the master's own
time on the appeal is unduly harsh because there will be times when at
least some of the master's time should be compensated. 297 The court re-
295. The same reasoning should apply for a master in any other circuit who sought to
defend an award based on either Reed III or the standards proposed in this Article, or both.
Of course, this author believes that the Reed III position is substantially correct; it is only in a
procedural sense that the defense of the appeal in Reed IV might be characterized as "unrea-
sonable or frivolous."
296. The outside counsel's fee, however, should be reviewed for reasonableness as would
any court-set attorney's fee under Christianburg. It should not be reviewed for success on the
merits under Hensley.
297. Cf. Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir.) (attorney appearing pro se,
when other plaintiffs had counsel, entitled to fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982),
although existence of other counsel might affect amount of fees if redundant legal services
claimed), opinion vacated & reh'g en banc granted, 756 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1985); Cazalas v.
Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing policy reasons for
permitting a fee award to a pro se attorney litigating a Freedom of Information Act claim, but
not to a pro se lay litigant); Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1980) (awarding fee
under Christiansburg to pro se attorney defendants who "did not seek out a chance for pro se
litigation to compensate for an inactive practice; they were forced to defend against frivolous
claims.. ."); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 584 F. Supp. 849, 859-61 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(three-judge court) (granting some fees to attorneys, who were also members of state legisla-
ture, who served as attorneys and pro se litigants in redistricting action); Bradley, Pro Se
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viewing the fee request, however, should ensure that the master is not
simply duplicating the work of outside counsel.298 For example, the spe-
cial master rarely should be involved in writing an appellate brief beyond
limited participation in early strategy sessions, and perhaps, quickly re-
viewing it in the final stages. Similarly, the master should not be com-
pensated for time spent travelling to and attending oral argument before
the appellate court.299 The master has nothing to contribute to such a
time consuming function. There are, however, a few areas in which only
the master or his or her office can act most efficiently. For example, the
master should be compensated for preparing factual records concerning
work performed. In sum, the master should not be absolutely barred
from compensation for time spent on an unsuccessful appeal, even after
he makes the wise decision to hire outside counsel, as long as his work
clearly does not duplicate the work of the outside counsel.
Conclusion
This Article has reviewed the history of fees for special masters, re-
vealing a long history of problems with these fees. In the past, masters
working in a fee for service structure had a strong incentive to invent
work or otherwise delay a case as long as possible. A contributing cause
was lack of court supervision. This chronic problem can be avoided only
if courts appointing special masters carefully review their fees. In a dis-
tressingly large number of cases, however, modern courts do not appear
to be using any standards for the calculation or review of special masters'
fees. The long history of abuse underscores the need for constant vigi-
lance on the part of the trial courts.300 Cases in which the judges have
attempted to review fees with some care, such as the Reed series dis-
cussed above, are few and far between.
Complainants and the Freedom of Information Act: Neglected, Not Rejected, 37 AD. L. REV.
15 (1985); Note, Awarding Fees to the Self-Represented Attorney Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291 (1984-85); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to Prevail-
ing Pro Se Litigants, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (1982); Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: Attorney Fees
for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1982).
298. Cf. Sun Publishing Co. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1512, 1517-18 (E.D.
Va. 1984) (holding in statutory attorney's fee context that no fees would be awarded for dupli-
cative work occasioned by midstream change in counsel).
299. Cf. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1984) (reducing
attorney's fee award when two attorneys travelled to and attended each proceeding for
plaintiff).
300. There are still occasional appointments that create some concern. E.g., Touissaint v.
McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1421-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (A district court judge appointed his
26-year-old former law clerk the special master in prison case at a fee of $75 per hour.); see
supra note 6.
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In the institutional reform litigation cases, and in other cases such as
original docket matters in which the litigants are states, at least some of
the litigants responsible for the fees of the masters are public entities.
Accordingly, trial courts should be particularly careful before permitting
the expenditure of public sums on special masters' fees. The courts cer-
tainly should be at least as scrupulous in reviewing the master's fees as
they are in reviewing requests for attorney's fees under fee-shifting stat-
utes. The sensitivities aroused by a federal court ordering a state defend-
ant to expend funds on court-set priorities underscore the need for those
expenditures to be carefully monitored by the court itself. Moreover, in
some cases with masters' fees of spectacular size, such as the Reed cases
in which the fees exceeded one million dollars, excessive special master's
fees may deprive plaintiffs who have had their rights violated of money
for direct services.
301
Federal courts have considered several fee standards in the recent
past: first, unbounded discretion of the trial court; second, application of
a test, developed by the Supreme Court in Newton, that compensation
should be "liberal but not exorbitant"; third, the Hart/Reed H & IV
method of basing the fee on one-half of the prevailing rates for commer-
cial attorneys; and fourth, the Reed III approach of basing the fee on
some variation of the lodestar method of setting attorney's fees. This
Article has proposed that the lodestar method be adopted with appropri-
ate modifications to suit the case of special masters. After setting a lode-
star, based on a reasonable hourly rate and hours reasonably spent by the
special master, the court should consider a variety of factors that might
affect the lodestar. These factors include preclusion of other employ-
ment, time limitations imposed, results obtained, desirability and unde-
sirability of the position, awards in similar cases, delay of payment, and
professional responsibility considerations. In many instances, the court
will adjust the lodestar downward as a result of these factors; the court is
less likely to make an upward adjustment. This Article also has pro-
posed that a special master normally should be compensated even for an
unsuccessful defense on appeal of a fee award. Finally, although this
Article has focused on calculating fees for remedial special masters, the
standards proposed here can be utilized readily to establish the fee of any
special master.
The potential abuses of the special master office can be avoided if the
301. Cf. Tonti v. Petropoulous, 656 F.2d 212, 220-21 app. (6th Cir. 1981) (district court's
opinion published as appendix at 218-21) (use of public funds for attorney's fees in school
desegregation cases reduces funds available for education of plaintiff class benefited by litiga-
tion, citing Reed II).
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courts are explicit from the outset as to the master's duties. It should be
clear what will and will not be compensated, what the fees will be, and
how the master will be paid. The final check on propriety comes when
the court carefully examines the master's fee request, as did the Reed III
court, to determine that it is fair and reasonable. The review urged here
will impose an additional burden on the trial courts, and admittedly cre-
ates a new opportunity for "satellite litigation" that could be costly in
itself.302 Without a scrupulous examination of special masters' fees, how-
ever, the potential for abuse may ripen into scandal, as it has too often
over the centuries.
302. Some have expressed concern that applying the lodestar method of calculating attor-
ney's fees occasionally has imposed a burden on the courts. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 (3d Cir. 1984); 2
M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 9, 118.01, at 18-5 to -6; When the Court Awards Fees,
Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at S6, col. 1. But see Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 265, at 31-
32 (recommending retention of the lodestar method, despite real deficiencies in the process).
Reviewing a master's fee petition in even the most complex case will not be nearly as burden-
some as some attorney's fee petitions have been. Cf In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
611 F. Supp. 1296, 1302-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (modified by the court before publication)
(describing efforts of court's expanded staff over three months to review fee petitions from over
120 lawyers); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 68, 80 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984) (73 hours of hearings needed to review 41
fee petitions for 160 lawyers).
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